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Too Many Bells? Too Many Whistles?
Corporate Governance in the Post Enron, Post
WorldCom Era
Douglas M. Branson
Abstract
No one has stepped back to take a comprehensive look at what pundits, academics,
regulators, software companies, service providers and others have suggested in the
name of corporate governance reform. This article does so, describing the morass
that has been overlaid on Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), as well as the costs (but not the
details) of SOX itself. This examination of beyond SOX, or SOX and beyond,
demonstrates that many regulators, legislators and commentators never learned
the lesson that their mothers taught them, “More isn’t necessarily better.”
Too Many Bells?  Too Many Whistles?  Corporate Governance in the Post 
Enron, Post WorldCom Era
Douglas M. Branson*
When the pendulum swings, it swings too far.  The Enron debacle, both 
ending and beginning with a bankruptcy in December, 2001, and a perfect storm 
in governance terms, was the first to nudge the pendulum.  WorldCom=s 
bankruptcy, in July, 2002, resulted in loses for millions of investors, and caused 
the pendulum=s swing to gather speed.  By all accounts, the July 30, 2002, 
Sarbanes-Oxley legislation1 pushed the pendulum past the centerline, how far 
being the principal disagreement.  Adelphia Communications, Tyco, HealthSouth, 
Global Crossing, Marsh & McCellan, Hollinger International, and other 
*
  W. Edward Sell Professor of Business Law, University of Pittsburgh.  Earlier 
versions of this paper were presented to the Australasian Law Teachers Conference, 
Waikato, New Zealand, in July, 2006, and to the Board of Directors, FNB Corp., at a 
corporate governance workshop, August, 2006.
1.   Pub. L. 107-204, 11 Stat. 745 (2002).   The official popular name is the Public 
Company Accounting and Investor Protection Act of 2002.  Popular appellations include 
SOA and SOXA, as well as SOX.
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governance imbroglios have pushed the pendulum further.2
2
.  See, e.g., William M. Bulkeley & Charles Forelle, How Corporate Scandals 
Gave Tech Firms A New Business Line, Wall St. J., Dec. 9, 2005, at A1 (A>Sarbanes-
Oxley changed the world=@; AA new gusher of technology sales is emerging ....@).
The pundits, law professors, corporate governance advocates, commercial 
providers, and other reformers, though, continue to write on, unaware that this 
reform is breaking real world backs.  Their unstated assumption is that, in 
corporate governance, more is always better: more board meetings, more audit 
committee meetings, longer meetings, longer meeting still, more certifications, 
more internal controls, new often untried, documentation of those controls, added 
auditing devices, beefed up gatekeepers, new gatekeepers, separate counsel for 
independent directors - the list goes on, with few questions asked about the 
marginal utility of all this.  The pendulum may have been pushed all the way, fully 
against the stops.
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This article=s purpose is threefold.  First, the article attempts to give an 
insight into the costs of (but not detail) the legislatively mandated corporate 
governance reforms.3 Second, the article attempts to survey the reforms which 
reformers would have layered upon the reforms Sarbanes-Oxley dictates.  No 
one has attempted a snapshot, let alone a comprehensive picture, of the 
cumulative toll all of this corporate governance reform poses.  Third, the article 
makes some suggestions that may have the effect of pulling the pendulum toward
the center line.
Background.  A number of entities and individuals watch over the modern 
corporation and its performance.  In modern parlance, those who earn their 
3
.   The many pieces which summarize Sarbanes-Oxley include, inter alia, 
Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform 
(And It Just Might Work), 35 Conn. L. Rev. 915 (2003); Brian Kim, Recent 
Development: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 40 Harv. J. Legis. 235 (2005); and Larry E. 
Ribstein, Market Versus Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. Corp. L. 1 (2002).  Shorter pieces include Michael 
Allen, Bush Signs Corporate Reforms Into Law: President Says Era of >False Profits= Is 
Over, Washington Post, July 31, 2002, at A4, and Sarbanes-Oxley: A Price Worth 
Paying?, The Economist, May 19, 2005, at 71.
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livelihood doing so  are Amonitors.@  The corporate governance Amonitoring 
model@ focuses on the board of directors, the subgroup of independent directors, 
and the committees of the board, most particularly the audit, nominating and 
compensation committees.4 With little effort, however, one can total up no less 
than 12-13 watchdogs or Amonitors@ of corporate performance, investors, whether 
public or private, aside:
$ The board of directors.
$ Independent directors.
$ Committees of the board, including the audit committee.
$ Debt rating agencies.
$ Accounting firms.
$ Lawyers and law firms.
$ Securities brokers (Aregistered representatives@) and analysts.
4
.  See, e.g., Chapter 5, AThe Monitoring Model,@ in DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE '' 5.01-5.08, at 227-245 (1993)(with annual 
supplements).
$ The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
$ The NYSE or NASDAQ (self regulatory agencies).
$ Specialized government agencies (for example, FERC or state 
PUCs).
$ Financial press (television, magazines, and newspapers).
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$ Whistle blowers, real and ersatz.5
Modern corporations cannot continue their existence as publicly held firms 
without the certification or approval of certain of these monitors, such as the 
board, independent directors, the audit committee, a public accounting firm, a 
multi-service law firm, the SEC, perhaps a specialized agency or two, both at the 
federal and at the state level.  Those monitors whose certification is essential are 
Agatekeepers,@ Areputational intermediaries who provide verification and 
certification services@ both to corporations and investors.6 Without them, the 
corporation ceases to move forward.
5
.  See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Enron - When All Systems Fail: Creative 
Destruction or Roadmap to Corporate Governance Reform, 48 Vill. L. Rev. 989, 996 
(2003).
6
.  John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: AIt=s About the Gatekeepers, 
Stupid,@ 57 Bus. Law. 1403, 1405 (2002).  
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Certain monitors may be mere monitors to some corporations while they 
are gatekeepers vis a vis other companies.  Debt rating agencies thus may be 
monitors with regard to some issuers of bonds, who regard their debt=s rating 
interesting but not essential.  The same agencies may be gatekeepers for other 
issuers for whom, like Enron, a high rating is essential for continued access to 
markets. Some commentators eschew the terminology as having Ano analytical 
utility or legal significance.@7  Nonetheless, in the post Enron era the gatekeeper 
terminology has become ubiquitous.8
Darwin=s Asurvival of the fittest@ seems to apply to gatekeepers= evolution 
and the roles they play in corporate governance.  Over the years certain 
gatekeepers= influence ebbs while others= increases.  As law morphed from a 
profession to a business, the attorney=s role lessened from that of a deal guru and 
wise counselor to that of a technician that could be replaced by any of several 
others, many of whom might perform the task more cheaply.  Public accounting, 
once universally regarded as a repository of integrity and probity, had become a 
commodity offered at prices which met or undercut those of competitors.  By 
contrast, the financial press, arguably more a monitor than a gatekeeper, 
7
.  Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial Insurance 
Alternative to Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 413, 417 & n. 6 (2004).
8
.  See, e.g., Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of 
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 301, 304 (2004).
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gathered strength and prospered.  Seemingly, each corporate earnings report 
has become the source of a news story while 20 or 30 years ago earnings were 
simply numbers the press reported in the back pages.
One widely used approach to SOX is to view it as an attempt by Congress 
to reverse this Darwinian slide, bolstering up certain of the gatekeepers.  The 
statute takes Aoff the shelf@ many, sometimes conflicting, structural devices that 
may help restore gatekeepers to their rightful positions.9  Other provisions put 
gatekeepers in positions that they have never occupied.  Overall, a principal SOX 
focus is on Agatekeeper accountability.@10
9
.   See Robert C. Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policymakers Too,@ Olin Center for Law, 
Economics and Business, Harvard University, Discussion Paper No. 525, Sept., 2005, 
available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin at 2 (AThese reform ideas [taken 
>off the shelf,= so to speak] were around long enough to have simulated some empirical 
studies that cast doubt on their validity ...@); Cunningham, supra note, at 918 (A[The} Act 
reenacts in a new federal guise more than a dozen federal regulations, state laws, stock 
exchange and securities industry rules ....@)(footnote omitted).
10
.  Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, The Qualified Legal Compliance 
Committee: Using the Attorney Conduct Rules To Restructure the Board of Directors, 
53 Duke L.J. 517, 519-20 (2003)(A[C]ongress sought, through Sarbanes-Oxley, to 
improve corporate decision making indirectly by imposing new obligations - including 
standards of conduct, regulation of conflicts, and disclosure obligations on outside 
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professionals ....@)(footnotes omitted); John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud and Securities 
Reform: An Enron Prosecutor=s Perspective, 76 Cl. L. Rev. 57, 59-60 (2005)(since the 
1930s, our regime has relied on five sets of gatekeepers: Aindependent auditors, 
corporate boards of directors, private securities analysts ... securities regulators@ and 
Aprosecutors@).
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A Selected SOX Reform or Two.  Business and law articles and even 
entire treatises have devoted themselves to what SOX provides, criticisms of it, 
recommendations of how to implement it, and installation of structures and 
devices which, will not required by SOX, support SOX=s implementation.11 This 
article merely recounts one controversial Areform@ measure SOX mandates to 
give flavor to and create context for the main subject, Abeyond SOX,@ or ASOX 
Plus,@ and Ajust how much might all of this cost?@
SOX section requires that senior executives of public companies attest to 
the efficacy of internal accounting controls.12  They must also see to it that public 
accountants supply a similar attestation.13  Managers and accountants must do 
so in the lengthy, gray annual report public companies file with the SEC each 
year on SEC Form 10K.14
11
.   See, e.g., MARC I. STEINBERG, ATTORNEY LIABILITY AFTER 
SARBANES-OXLEY (2005); Larry Ribstein, Sarbox: The Road To Nirvana, 150 Mich. 
St. L. Rev.1 (2004); Ribstein, Market v. Regulatory Approaches to Corporate Fraud: A 
Critique of Sarbanes-Oxley, 28 J. Corp. L. 1 (2002); articles cited supra note 2,
12
.   SOX ' 404(a).
13
.   SOX ' 404 (b)(accountants).
14
.   Securities Exchange Act of 1934 '' 13(a)(2) & 15(d), 15 U.S.C. '' 78m(a) & 
78o(d).
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SOX also requires that firms file periodic reports with the SEC on an 
Aaccelerated@ basis.  Firms must file 10K=s within two, rather than three, months 
after their fiscal year closes.15  They must eventually file quarterly reports, which 
remain unaudited, within 35 days after a quarter closes.16  I include these more 
mundane SOX features only because thus was born the nomenclature, 
Aaccelerated filers,@ which has come to loom large in the SOX section 404 
attestation rule context.
Large teams of expensive accountants soon descended on public 
companies.  These accountants examined each and every accounting control, or 
the deficiency or absence of controls.  They required installation of new controls 
and documentation of each and every control. 
Some of this exercise proved beneficial.  Expert accountants define internal 
controls as devices which cause mangers to Asqueeze the numbers@ as they 
ascend up through the corporate organization, eventually contributing to the 
numbers the corporation publishes on its financial statements.  With adequate 
controls, senior managers have increased assurances that the final numbers 
reported reflect economic reality. Thus, for example, internal controls require that 
at each and every juncture managers certify revenues, costs and other 
15
.   See SEC Release No. 33-8128 (Sept. 5, 2002).
16
.   Rachel McTague, Again, SEC Votes to Give Smaller Companies '404 
Relief, BNA Fed. Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 37-38, 1611, at 1612 (Sept. 26, 2005).
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accounting numbers, in a work center, at a plant, within a division, on up to a 
subsidiary, and on to the parent corporation=s income statement and balance 
sheet, as those numbers percolate up through an organization.
Much has also proven to be trivial:
Examples of remedial actions pressed upon companies by auditors in 
connection with 404 reviews include the following: having the technical 
support Ahelp desk@ document every call it receives from employees; 
requiring employees to respond to thousands of emails to prove that they 
received them; proving that all the physical keys to an office in Europe 
have been accounted for since it opened in 1995; and requiring an auditor 
to attend a meeting to prove that it took place.  More generally, since those 
items have a tendentious flavor, the section 404 attestation requirement is 
costly because it has pressed companies to document control processes 
much more fully and elaborately; to define and enforce restrictions on 
access to information technology systems; to separate accounting and 
financial functions, even in smaller offices ....17
17
.  Clark, supra note , at 30, paraphrasing American Electronics Association, 
Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404: The ASection,@ Unintended Consequences, and its Impact 
on Small Business, February, 2005, available at AeA website, www.aeanet.org, at 2.  
See also Honesty Is the Best Policy, Business Week, Oct. 27, 2005, at 100:
[M]anufacturers will have to prove that they can trace products from assembly 
line to customer.  Temp agencies will have to show that the 
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A large portion of the expense stems from SOX section 404 requirements 
that corporations prove the negative, or demonstrate a higher certainty that such 
is the case.18
hours they bill match those worked by their employees.
18
.  Bulkeley & Forelle, supra note , for example report that recent corporate 
scandals show that at many companies Athe process can still be ripe for manipulation@:
Employees can make false entries in the database, modify the dates of 
transactions or generate unauthorized expenditures.
Sarbanes-Oxley aims to curb these abuses. ... Companies need to demonstrate 
to auditors, for instance, that their programs are configured to reject bogus 
entries after the close of the quarter, or that they have a security system in place 
that would stop a rogue employee from writing himself a giant check.
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An unintended consequence at accounting firms themselves is that many 
capable accountants, rather than be dragooned in section 404 compliance work, 
which often has to be performed on the road and away from home for days at a 
time, are leaving public accounting.19
19
  Conversation by the author with a departing Ernst & Young partner, 
Pittsburgh, PA, Oct. 8, 2005.
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SOX put also into law restrictions the SEC had adopted in 1999 in the form 
of regulations.20  Public accounting firms may no longer perform 9 categories of 
Aconsulting services=@ ranging from in-house accounting and human resources to 
mergers and acquisitions and actuarial work or fairness opinions, at least for 
clients whose financial statements the accounting firm audits.21  For firms, 
auditing may no longer be offered as a loss leader but must stand on its own 
bottom.  Section 404 attestation work, and the auditing and documentation that 
goes with it, have surpassed consulting as profit centers.  For accountants, or at 
least many of the best and brightest of them, more and more they feel as though 
their specialties and seniority are being stripped away from them.
20
.    These are the so-called Leavitt reforms, mandating separation of auditing 
and consulting, which are in turn based upon the recommendations of an American Bar 
Association Blue Ribbon Committee on audit committee reform.   See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. '
210.2-01(c)(4)(i)-(ix)(2002).
21
   SOX ' 201 (a)(requirements for Aindependence,@ which still permits firms to 
undertake comfort letter writing in securities offerings and tax work).  Of the 52 million 
Arthur Andersen billed Enron in 2000, 25 million represented auditing work while the 
rest represented consulting services.  See, e.g., Branson, supra note 5, at 1010.
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The SEC originally estimated that section 404 attestation would cost $91 
thousand per corporation.22  At the outset of the exercise, the SEC estimated $2 
million per firm.23  At nearly the same time, 217 Amid cap@ companies estimated 
that the new procedure would add $3.14 million to per company compliance 
costs.24  The same companies reported average numbers at $4.36 million, or 
almost 40 percent more than estimates.  They reported a 66 percent rise in 
external costs for consulting, software and the like, and a 58 percent rise in the 
fees they had estimated public accountants would charge.  The number of person 
hours for 404 compliance averaged 26,758.7.  Autodesk, a California company 
whose capitalization is $10.2 billion, reported spending $6 million and expending 
28,000 person hours in the first year of section 404 attestation.25  The aggregate 
22
.  SEC Release No. 33-8238, at n. 174 (June 11, 2003).
23
.  Joyce E. Cutler, Firms Note Frustration with Sarbanes-Oxley, Seek ARational@
Inspection of Costs, Benefits, BNA Fed. Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 37-8, Feb. 11, 2005, 
at 333 (Feb. 21, 2005).
24
.  Rachel McTague, FEI Finds that Actual Costs of Compliance with SOX 
Section 404 Exceeds Estimates, id.  No. 37-13, March 21, 2005, at 576 (Mar. 28, 
2005).  Although the definitions are imprecise, under one common formulation, a mid 
cap company would be one whose market capitalization exceeds $1 billion but is less 
than $5 billion.
25
.   Id., No. 37-8, Feb. 11, 2005, at 333 (Feb. 21, 2005).  The large national law 
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cost SOX 404 imposes has been estimated at $35 billion per year.26
firm, Foley & Lardner, reported that in its first year SOX increased coronations=
governance legal costs by 94 percent.   Market capitalizations come  from Yahoo 
Finance (visited Nov. 12. 2005).
26
  American Electronic Association Report, supra note 17, at 2.
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In subsequent years, presumably, corporations will have lower compliance 
costs in order to obtain the needed section 404 attestations.  Lower costs have 
not stopped the proliferation of SOX consulting firms and products.  Two of 
Forbes=s top 14 small cap stock picks for 2006, Corporate Executive Board, Inc., 
and Resources Connection, Inc., are SOX consulting firms.27  Large consulting 
firms such as IBM or Accenture and Bearing Point, the latter two consulting firms 
spun off from Big 4 (formerly Big 5) accounting firms, as well as smaller entities 
such as Mercer Delta Consulting, Hyperion Solutions, Inc., Movaris, and 
Shareholder.com, aggressively market SOX services, including section 404 
attestations.28  All the software firms have SOX products as well, ranging from the 
bigs (Oracle and Microsoft) to the small (Paisley Consulting of Cokato, 
27
.  Fourteen Favorites, Forbes, Oct. 31, 2005, 171, at 174.  As of Nov. 12, 2005, 
the corporations had market capitalizations of $3.42 billion and $1.39 billion, 
respectively.
28
.  See, e.g., Carol Hymowitz, Experiments in Corporate Governance, Special 
Section, Wall St. J., June 24, 2005, R-1, at R-2; Phyllis Plitch, A Piece of the Action, id., 
Oct. 27, 2003 (subtitled ACorporate Governance is hot - and there=s no shortage of 
companies promising to help,@ featuring Movaris, Restricted Stock Systems, PeopleSoft 
and Shareholder.com).  See also Kris Maher, Sarbanes-Oxley Is a Boon For Slew of 
Consultants, id., Aug. 19, 2003, at B1 (description of Ehticspoint, Inc., Listen Up Group, 
and whistle blower hotline consultants).
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Minnesota).29  Projections are that corporations will spend $7.5 billion per year on 
SOX software.30
Finally, with a stroke that will hold the line on corporations= costs, a Federal 
District Judge held that, in enacting SOX, Congress had no intention whatsoever 
of creating a private right of action to investors allegedly aggrieved by violations 
of SOX.31  The holding is a death knell to class actions for damages in cases of 
SOX violations by corporations.  At least corporations do not have to worry (for 
now) about liability to investors for SOX violations.
29
.  Peter Loftus, Software for Sarbanes-Oxley, Wall St. J., April 25, 2005, at R-8 
(also reviewing products and services of Browne & Co., EMC Corp., Steelent, Inc., 
Global Compliance Services, and Resources Connection, Inc.).
30
.  Bulkeley & Forelle, supra note (describing SOX  software by Consul Risk 
Management, Inc., EMC Corp., RSA Security, Inc., Computer Associates International, 
Virsa Systems, Inc., Orchestria, Inc., Lumigent Technologies, Inc., and Serena 
Software, Inc.).
31
.  Neer v. Perino, 389 F. Supp. 2d 648 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
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Praise and Criticism for SOX.  Evidently believing that the SEC has been 
taking names, at least in their public pronouncements, public company officials 
have been timid in their criticism, or have praised SOX, albeit faintly so.  The 
CEO of a small cap manufacturer of industrial products says that SOX requires Aa 
lot more@ documentation, makes it harder to recruit board members, and is 
Aespecially burdensome for small cap firms.@32 The Enron restructuring officer 
reports that SOX provides a A>very helpful= blueprint for reform.@33 The 
representative of a large institutional investor (the Ohio Public Employees 
Retirement System) thinks that SOX is Aa step in the right direction.@34  A general 
counsel believes that Athere is a lot more right than wrong@ and a corporate 
governance watchdog says she Awouldn=t make any >substantive changes.=@35
The chief accounting officer of a well know large cap corporation opines that 
ASarbanes Oxley is working well.@36
32
.  Judith Burns, Is Sarbanes-Oxley Working?, Wall St. J., June 24, 2001, at R8 
(remarks of Jane Dolan).
33
.  Id. (remarks of Stephen Cooper).
34
.  Id. (remarks of Cynthia Richson)(internal quotation marks omitted).
35
.  Id. at R-9 (remarks of Logan Robinson and Nell Minow).
36
.  Id. (remarks of Arnie Hanish at Eli Lily & Co.).
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The more outspoken of SOX=s sponsors, Representative Michael G. Oxley 
of Ohio, weighed in with comments that SOX=s costs are Ainsubstantial@ and 
Aeminently reasonable.@37  In a speech at the World Bank on September 16, 
2003, Representative Oxley pointed out that Aretail investors came back to the 
markets after nearly two years of scandal and plummeting fortunes. ... [w]e had a 
small part in restoring that investor confidence.@38  The now former Chairman of 
the SEC, William Donaldson, touted SOX as a Avaluable government 
intervention,@ one which Ahelped to improve the
>tone at the top= of U.S. public companies.@39  The NASD=s President joined the 
chorus, stating that A[u]nlike some others on Wall Street, I support Sarbanes-
Oxley.  It=s a good thing ...  serious legislation that struck a responsible 
37
.  Rachel McTague, House Panel Argues Compliance Costs of Sarbanes-Oxley 
Are Not Substantial, BNA Fed. Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 35-31, at 1289 (July 29, 
2003)(Aug. 4, 2003).
38
.  Richard Hill, Oxley Says Returning Investors Signal Renewed market
Confidence, Success of Law, id., No. 35-37, at 1550  (Sept. 22, 2003).
39
.  Donaldson Cites Sarbanes-Oxley As` AValuable Government Intervention,@
id., No. 36-44, at 1969 (speech sponsored by Detroit Economic Club and the University 
of Toledo School of Law, Oct. 29, 2004)(Nov. 8, 2004).
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compromise.@40  The God-like Alan Greenspan, Federal Reserve Chairman, 
found SOX Aproving surprisingly effective,@ revealing the he had been Aan early 
and passionate advocate in internal deliberations to make chief executives more 
accountable.@41
40
.  Bob Greifeld, The View from NASDAQ, Wall St. J., Jan. 30. 2004, at A-10.
41
.  David Wessel, Greenspan Says Sarbanes-Oxley Is Proving Surprisingly 
Effective, Wall St. J., May 16, 2005, at C3.  Similar is an editorial by Paul Volcker, Fed 
Chairman from 1979-1987, and Arthur Levitt, Jr., SEC Chairman from 1993-2002, In 
Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, id., June 14, 2004, at A16 (AWe believe the benefits of the 
legislation outweigh the costs@).
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On the private side, a large public accounting firm took out a full page 
advertisement in a national newspapers, stating (without empirical support) that 
Ato see the real impact of 404 - improved investor confidence evidenced by a 
better capital allocation process - will take more than a few months.@42
For the most part, academics have been outspokenly scornful in their 
criticism of SOX.43 In an op-ed piece, one leading scholar questioned Astrict 
enforcement of Sarbanes-Oxley in spite of mounting evidence that it is costly 
beyond any conceivable benefits.@44  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce President 
has been strident in his criticism.  He calls the costs of section 404 to be 
Aunjustified@ and labels the SEC as Aover-reaching@ in its administration of the 
statute.45 In an earlier pronouncement, he expressed the conclusion that SOX 
42
.   PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Athe glass is half full, but that=s debatable,@
advertisement, Wall St. J., Feb. 10, 2005, at A5.
43
.   See, e.g., Donald Kahn, Let=s Get Real - Why the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Is a 
Sham, at http://kahnlawchicago.com (2004); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 Yale L. J. 1521 (2005).
44
.  Henry Manne, Life After Donaldson, Wall St. J., June 6, 2005, at A10.
45
.   Brett Ferguson, Chamber Raps Regulator Excessiveness in Overseeing 
Governance, Cites SEC, Spitzer, BNA Fed. Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 37-2, at 52 (Jan. 5, 
2005)(Jan. 10, 2005).
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produces a Arisk averse economy,@ Aputs too much of a burden on executives and 
officers to be perfect,@ and Ahas created enormous uncertainty.@46
46
.  Richard Hill, U.S. Chamber Chief Says Sarbanes-Oxley Will Hinder Business 
Innovation, id., No. 34-37, at 1532 (Sept. 18, 2002)(Sept. 23, 2002).
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On its editorial page, the Wall Street Journal has been profuse, and 
colorful, in its criticism.  Bemoaning the cost of section 404 compliance, the 
Journal editorial notes that SOX Adid achieve one miracle.  The accounting 
profession - reviled as the moral equivalent of porn merchants just two years ago 
- has been lofted to unexpected new heights of power and prosperity.@47  Big 4 
accounting firms raised their audit fees 50 percent per year; the writer reports that 
the accountants expected to do the same in 2005 as well.  Fortune 100
corporations paid $6 billion in fees in 2003.  Among the Fortune 500, the average 
fees individual firms paid for auditing rose from $2,930,000, in 2001, to 
$7,443,000, in 2004.48
47
.  Holman Jenkins, Jr., Thinking Outside the Sarbox, Wall St. J., Nov. 24, 2004, 
at A13.
48
.  Deborah Solomon, At What Price?, Wall St. J., Oct. 17, 2005, at R3.  See 
also Bean Counter Bonanza, Business Week, Oct. 27, 2003, at 101 (50 to 100 % 
increases expected in 2004 audit fees).
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Other critics have chosen to remain out of sight, or be lukewarm in their 
denunciations. Overall, among the public pronouncements, praises outweigh the 
criticisms. 
Calls for SOX II.   Extremely knowledgeable commentators have called 
outright for amendments to SOX 404, deleting the requirement for accountants=
attestations and possibly altogether for small cap and, possibly, some mid cap 
corporations.49 For those companies, section 404 is regressive.  Corporations 
must pay out a large portion of the $2-3 million per year from a much smaller 
revenue base. Because their products may be unestablished or experimental, 
even before SOX many of these companies teetered on the brink of profitability.
Indeed, the cost of compliance may be much higher for many smaller 
corporations.  For years, large companies have had in place internal accounting 
staffs which had, as a principal task, evaluation, implementation, and 
documentation of internal controls of the type SOX requires.  Internal accounting 
functions barely exist at smaller corporations, if they exist at all.  For practical 
purposes, with section 404 exercises, most small cap companies began from 
scratch, writing on a clean slate. On a relative basis, their costs are much higher.
49
.  Clark, supra note 9, at 29.
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The one size fits all mind set also persists, forcing smaller companies to 
do, or feel that they must undertake, the same SOX tasks as larger companies, 
as for instance in the installation and verification of internal controls.  In 
addressing the European Parliamentary Financial Securities Forum, SEC 
Commissioner Paul Atkins blames the PCAOB, which by its thick, gray Auditing 
Standard Number 2, notable for Asheer length and tone ... has contributed to an 
excess of caution and an emphasis on endless detail.@50  Commissioner Cynthia 
Glassman is more colorful: Aa company having 40,000 key [internal] controls is an 
oxymoron.  How can they all be key?@51
50
.  Atkins Calls for SEC Review of PCAOB Internal-Controls Standard, BNA 
Fed. Sec, Reg. & L. Rep. No. 37-44, at 1867 (Nov. 7, 2005)(calling for SEC oversight of 
PCAOB standards and guidelines).
51
.  Kip Betz, Glassman Says 404 Rules Aimed at Holding Management 
Accountable, id., No. 37-41, at 1738 (Oct. 17, 2005)(SOX 404 rules Ahave turned off 
course and must be refocused on their original intent@)(speech at Brooklyn Law 
School).  Citing the Aone size fits all@ effect, with one dissension, the SEC Advisory 
Committee recommended, among other things, that regulations exempt small cap 
companies from the requirement for external assessments of internal controls.  Alison 
Carpenter, SEC Advisory Group on Small Companies Backs Looser Section 404 
Reporting Rules, BNA Fed. Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 37-49, at 2113 (Dec. 19, 2005).
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One growing category of small cap company had been foreign issuers who 
sought to have their shares listed on the NYSE or traded NASDAQ.  As an 
example, Professor Jack Coffee point to the number of Israeli high tech firms that 
sought U.S. listings in 1999 and before.52  He has predicted a continued migration 
of listings to the U.S. which saw 750 foreign listings in 2000, compared to 170 in 
1990, as firms sought to associate with stricter corporate governance regimes.53
52
.  John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future As History: The Prospects For Global 
Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 641, 675 
(1999)(more than 100 Israeli firms, of which 70 are high tech, listed on NYSE, NASDAQ 
or AMEX).
53
.  Coffee, Race To the Top? The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market 
Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 Columb. L. Rev. 1757, 1770-
71 (2002)(noting that by 2002, 17% of the 3300 firms with NYSE listings were foreign).
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Post SOX much of the discussion has been either solely rhetoric, or a 
combination of rhetoric with anecdotes, concerning withdrawal from U.S. markets. 
 An editorial asserts Aconcern about the number of European and Asian 
companies delisting from, or not listing on, U.S. exchanges, to say nothing of a 
drastic decline in IPOs.@54 AMexican Firms Leave NYSE@ profiles the departures 
of conglomerate Desc SA and steel manufacturer Groupo Imsa SA but contains 
no statistics.55 Another piece outlines some of the reasoning, over and above the 
costs of SOX compliance.  Capital markets in home countries tend to be much 
deeper and more liquid than they once were.  With computerized trading 
mechanisms such as E*Trade and Charles Schwab, U.S. investors find it much 
easier to access those foreign markets. Large European companies, such as 
VNU, Roche, and Addidas-Solomon, think a U.S. listing to be Aexpensive and ... a 
54
.   Manne, supra note 44, at A10.
55
.   Amy Guthrie, Mexican Firms Leave NYSE. Wall St. J., Jan. 17, 2005, at 
C14.
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lot of extra work.@56 For corporations on or close to the fence, the SOX 
compliance cost has been a tipping point against a U.S. listing.
56
.  Craig Karmin, Listing in the U.S. - Some Can=t Be Bothered, Wall St. J., Aug 
21, 2003, at C1.
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The statistics demonstrate that delistings by foreign corporations are not as 
frequent SOX critics predicted.  The NASDAQ had ten delistings in 2003.57  The 
NYSE had just two in 2003 and two in 2004.58  Delisting is difficult because the 
foreign firm must demonstrate that the number of U.S. resident holders of a class 
of its equities has fallen below 300,59 but, in December 2005, the SEC adopted 
new rule 12h-6, which makes it substantially easier for foreign firms, or those in 
good standing, to terminate their registrations.60
Instead, what the numbers demonstrate is that, rather than deregistrations 
of firms already resident, the number of foreign corporations coming to U.S. 
shores, seeking listings, has gone from a robust stream to a mere trickle.   From 
peaks of 63 in 1997, and 60 in 2000, the number of foreign firms seeking an 
57
.  Greifeld, supra note 40, at A10.
58
.  Sylvia Ascarelli, Citing Sarbanes, Foreign Companies Flee U.S. Exchanges, 
Wall St. J., Sept. 20, 2004, at C1.
59
.  See, e.g., David Epstein, Goodbye, Farewell Auf Wiedersehen, Adieu ..., 
Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 2005, at A10 (Athe barriers to deregistration are formidable@).
60
.  See Rachel McTague, SEC Unanimously Proposes Relaxation of 
Deregistration for Foreign Private Issuers, BNA Fed. Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 37-49, at 
2085 (Dec. 19, 2005).
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NYSE listing has fallen to 16 in 2003 and 8 in 2004.  Experts and firms 
themselves cite SOX compliance as the culprit.61
61
.  Ascarelli, supra note 58, C1, at C16.
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Besides call for amendment or repeal of SOX section 404, at least for small 
cap companies,62 well respected commentators have called for and outlined SOX 
repeal or accommodations for foreign corporations.63
The SEC Response: Delayed Implementation.  In the eyes of some, the 
SEC response has been lukewarm.  The first responses were that large 
corporations had to file 404 attestations on SEC annual report form 10K for fiscal 
years ending after June 15, 2004, or in the 10K for 2004 for calendar year 
reporters.  Smaller corporations would have to do so for years ending after 
August 15, 2005, or in the 10K for 2005 for calendar year filers.64  The 
62
.  See Andrew Skovokis, SOXA for Small Companies, 109 Penn. St. L. Rev. 
1279 (2005); Nathan Willda, David Pays for Goliath=s Mistakes: The Costly Effect of 
Sarbanes-Oxley on Small Companies, 38 J. Marshall L. Rev. 671 (2005).
63
.  See generally Roberta Karmel, The Securities and Exchange Commission 
Goes Abroad to Regulate Corporate Governance, 33 Stetson L. Rev.849 (2004); Larry 
E. Ribstein, International Implications of Sarbanes-Oxley: Raising the Rent on US Law, 
3 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 299 (2003); Note, Sarbanes-Oxley: Ignoring the 
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 36 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1211 (2004).  Professor 
Karmel is a former commissioner of the SEC.
64
.  Large Companies Expect to Spend Millions to Meet SOXA Internal Controls 
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Commission took a tough stance, noting that Aimproved corporate governance, 
improved financial reporting, [and] improved auditor performance is important for 
all companies, regardless of size.@65
Requirements,  BNA Fed. Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 36-7, at 315 (Feb. 16, 2004).
65
.  Richard Hill, Beller Says SEC Prepared to Ease Burden of SOX Compliance 
in Small Firms, id., No. 36-38, Sept. 27, 2004 (remarks of Alan Beller, Director, SEC 
Division of Corporate Finance).
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Early the following year the SEC began to take a more middle-of-the-road, 
accommodating stance.  The SEC delayed 404 filings for companies with a 
market capitalization less than $75 million until fiscal years ending after July, 
2007.66  SEC Chairman Donaldson took note of that and of another delayed 
implementation for foreign corporations.  He also publicized an SEC website the 
Commission had created so that Aall interested parties can send us feedback on 
their experiences with Section 404.@  Nonetheless, the SEC Chairman labeled 
cries for a partial repeal of SOX to be Ashort sighted.@67 The SEC also founded a 
21 member Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies which held its first 
66
.   See, e.g., Deborah Solomon, Small Business To Get Extension on Sarbanes 
Rule, Sept. 13, 2005, at A2.
67
.  William Donaldson, We=ve Been Listening, Wall St. J., March 29, 2005, at 
A4.
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meeting in April 2005.68
68
.   Kip Betz, Witnesses Ask Panel to Seek Amended SOX Rules for Smaller 
Firms, BNA Fed. Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 37-26, at 1129 (June 27, 2005).
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In September 2005, the SEC relented still further.  It announced a three 
tiered regulatory format, consisting of Alarge accelerated filers@ (market cap over 
$700 million), Aaccelerated filers@ (market cap under $700 million), and Anon-
accelerated filers@ (market cap under $75 million).69 The latter category numbers 
over 6,000 public companies which will not have to comply until after mid 2007.  
The Commissioners also exempted the middle category from the accelerated 
annual 60 day and quarterly 35 day filing deadlines.70
Critics of SEC accounting regulation were quick to speak out, Acrying foul@
over delayed implementation and what wags have termed ASOX Lite.@  An 
accounting professor noted that approximately 75 percent Aof companies that 
were the subject of fraud allegations ... in SEC enforcement releases from 1998 
to 2003 had market capitalizations of less than $700 million.@ AA good internal-
control system within these companies would have prevented a good number of 
those,@ stated another accounting teacher.71
69
.  SEC Sets Meeting Date to Consider Extending Compliance Date for Internal 
Controls Rules, id., No. 37-37, at 1555 (Sept. 19, 2005)(amendments to the definition of 
accelerated filer in SEC Rule 12b-2).
70
.  Rachel McTague, Again, SEC Votes Unanimously to Give Smaller 
Companies '404 Relief, id., No. 37-38, at1611 (Sept. 26, 2005).
71
.  Michela Rapoport, Watchdogs Frustrated by Sarbanes-Oxley Extension, Wall 
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St. J., Oct. 4, 2005, at C3 (remarks of Professor Joseph Carcello, University of 
Tennessee, and Professor Thomas Weirich, Central Michigan University).
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Studies flatly contradict the latter.  Fraud and accounting imbroglios come 
to light because of a tip (42.6 percent), by internal auditing (24.6 percent), 
through an accident (18 percent), by outside auditors= discovery (16.4 percent)
and, only last of all, by virtue of an internal control installed earlier (8.2 percent).72
Because of the costs involved, and their desperate attempts to hold the line on 
costs, smaller and other corporations are Aoutsourcing@ SOX section 404 
attestation work to India and other lower cost countries.73
Sun rosa, however, executives at a number of smaller cap public 
companies find themselves unable to obtain an accounting form to do SOX 404 
attestations at all, or to do them at a price anywhere near what companies feel 
they can afford.  The condition is so widespread that it has even taken on a 
name, ASarbanes-Oxley limbo.@ In Roman Catholic teachings, at least of the old 
fashioned kind, limbo is Aa region believed to exist on the border of hell as the 
abode of souls barred from heaven through no fault of their own (as souls of ... 
unbaptized infants).@74  Corporations= inability to comply at all may well have 
72
.  Clark, supra note 9, at 28-29.
73
.  See, e.g, Eric Bellman, One More Cost of Sarbanes-Oxley: Outsourcing to 
India, Wall St. J., July 14, 2005, at C1 (SOX 404 costs of $5.5 billion in 2004 and $5.8 
billion in 2005).
74
.  WEBSTER=S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (Unabridged) at 1312 
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played a part in the SEC decision to delay implementation to mid 2007.
(2002)(secondary definitions include Aa place or state of restraint or confinement ... [or] 
of neglect or oblivion@).
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Beyond SOX (or SOX and Beyond).  Despite the costs this article 
describes, at least in small part, corporate governance advocates and reformers 
layer added requirements over what SOX requires.  There is a first generation of 
Abest practices@ blueprints in corporate governance.  In the U.S., they include the 
General Motors 29 Points75 and the American Law Institute Principles of
Corporate Governance and Structure.76  Elsewhere in the world sources include 
75
.  GENERAL MOTOR BOARD OF DIRECTORS, GM BOARD GUIDELINES 
ON SIGNIFICANT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES (rev. ed. 1995).
76
.  AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1994) (hereinafter cited as 
ALI CORP. GOV. PROJ.).  The ALI effort to Arestate@, or state for the first time, 
principles applicable to corporate governance proved very controversial.  It began in 
1979, lasting until 1994.
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what is known as the Cadbury Report in England,77 the Vienot and Manzini 
Reports in France,78 the Bosch Report by the Institute of Corporate Directors in 
Australia,79 the Report in Italy,80 and many more.
77
.  COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, THE CODE OF BEST PRACTICE (London 1992).  Cadbury was 
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followed by the Greenbury Report on officers= and directors= remuneration (1995), and 
the Hampel Report (1998) on corporate governance.  Collectively, the three reports are 
also referred to as Cadbury and are re-published by the London Stock Exchange as the 
AYellow Book.@  They have recently been revised and re-issued as the Turnbull 
Guidance.
78
.  See, e.g., James Fanto, The Role of Corporate Law in French Corporate 
Governance, 31 Cornell Int=l L. J. 31 (1998).
79
.  AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF COMPANY DIRECTORS, CORPORATE 
PRACTICES AND CONDUCT (2d ed. 1993)(Henry Bosch A.O., Chair).
80
.  See, e.g., Valentina Barbanti, The Reform of Corporate Governance in the 
United States and the New Challenge of the European Union, 14 Ind. Int=l & Comp. L. 
Rev. 227 (2003); Marco Ventoruzzo, Experiments in Comparative Corporate Law: The 
Recent Italian Reform and Dubious Virtues of Market Rules in the Absence of 
Regulatory Competition, 40 Texas Int=l L. J. 113 (2004).
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In the United States, second generation sources include the academics=
articles and other pronouncements.81  Perhaps attempting to mushroom large 
engagements into even larger ones, the consulting firms come up with lists of 
governance Aadd ons.@  Other consultants, including no less than the venerable 
Standards & Poor Corporation, sell services which audit and then grade 
corporations= compliance with scores of corporate governance metrics.82  In the 
81
.  Academic blueprints include GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, 
RESTORING TRUST IN AMERICA=S BUSINESS INSTITUTIONS (Sloan Project on 
Business Institutions. Margaret Blair & William Bratton, editors, 2005); Neil H. Aronson, 
Preventing Future Enrons: Implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 8 Stan. J. L. 
Bus. & Fin. 127 (20002); Cunningham, supra note 2; and FAITH KAHN, A BLUEPRINT 
FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: STRATEGY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND THE 
PRESERVATION OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE (2003).
82
.   Institutional Shareholder Services uses a 61 point ACorporate Governance 
Quotient,@ http://www.isscgq/rating criteria.  The Corporate Library uses a similar 
system to rate ABoard Effectiveness,@
http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com/productsandservices/boardeffectiveness-ratings. 
See, also Clark, supra note , at 4 (listing Governance Metrics International, Moody=s 
and Standard & Poors=).  In September, 2005, Standard & Poors= ceased marketing its 
corporate governance ratings and services, which it had aggressively marketed at 
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larger corporate governance debacles, investigative committee of the board of 
directors render report and make good governance recommendations.  Two of 
the leading reports were the Powers Report at Enron, by a committee chaired by 
Law Dean William Powers of the University of Texas,83 and the Wilmer Cutler & 
Pickering report at WorldCom, under the names of three expansion directors, but 
prepared by a leading Washington, D.C. law firm.84  The American Bar 
Association rendered a report, which has its own recommendation, via a 
committee chaired by James Cheek of Nashville, Tennessee.85
symposia and seminars.  S & P will continue the ratings and services in emerging 
markets such as Russia.  Phyllis Plitch, S & P Gets Out of Rating Corporate 
Governance, Wall St. J., Sept. 13, 2005, at C3. 
83
.   WILLIAM C. POWERS, ET AL., REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION BY 
THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF 
ENRON CORPORATION (2002).
84
.   Dennis Beresford, Nicholas deB Katzenback & C.B. Rogers, Report of the 
Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of WorldCom, Inc. (Mar. 31, 
2003)(prepared by Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Washington, D.C.).
85
.   AMERICAN BAR ASSOC., REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (2003)(Thomas A. 
Cheek, III, Chair).  See also AMERICAN BAR ASSOC., PRELIMINARY REPORT OF 
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THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE 
RESPONSIBILITY (July 16, 2002).
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
When bankruptcy follows a governance debacle, bankruptcy examiners 
render lengthy written reports.86  Neal Batson rendered the report(s) in Enron.87
Governor Richard Thornburgh, assisted by his law firm, rendered no less than 
three lengthy reports in WorldCom=s bankruptcy.88
86
.  Notable examples include the appointment and report of the late Barry
Zaretsky at Revco Drug, Inc., see Professor Named to Probe Case of Revco Drugs,
Wall St. J., June 13, 1990, at A2, as well in the bankruptcies of Washington Group 
International (formerly Morrison Knudsen, Inc.) and Planet Hollywood.  See, e.g., 
Raytheon=s Statement on WGI Bankruptcy Examiner=s Report, PRNewswire, Aug. 28, 
2001; Planet Hollywood Forgave Loans: A Bankruptcy Examiner Says the Restaurant 
Company Wrote Off $5 Million in Loans to Celebrities, St. Petersburg Times, Aug. 14, 
2002, at D3.
87
.   See Neal Batson, First Interim Report of Neal Batson, Bankruptcy Examiner, 
No. 01-16034 (Br. SDNY 2001); Batson, Second Interim Report, No. 01-16034 (Br. 
SDNY 2002); Batson, Third Interim Report, No. 01-16034 (Br. SDNY 2003); Examiner 
Named for Enron, N.Y. Times, May 23, 2002, at C4.
88
.  Richard Thornburgh, First Interim Report of Dick Thornburgh, Bankruptcy 
Examiner, in In Re WorldCom, Inc., No. 2-15533 (Br. SDNY, Nov. 4, 2002); 
Thornburgh, Second Interim Report of Dick Thornburgh, Bankruptcy Examiner, in In Re 
WorldCom, Inc., No. 2-15533 (Br. SDNY, June 9, 3003); and Thornburgh, Third and 
Final Report of Dick Thornburgh, Bankruptcy Examiner, in In Re WorldCom, Inc., No. 2-
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15533 (Br. SDNY, Jan. 26, 2004).
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Last of all, a new player, the Acorporate monitor,@ has come into existence. 
 The first monitor report, by Richard Breeden, former Chairman of the SEC, 
entitled ARestoring Trust,@ provided the beginning framework for this section of 
the article.  ARestoring Trust@ mandates installation of one hundred corporate 
governance Aimprovements@ at WorldCom, now known as MCI, Inc.89  Mr. 
Breeden, and the consulting firm he has formed, have served as corporate 
monitor, and rendered reports, in several other high profile corporate governance 
cases, including Fannie Mae, Hollinger International, and KPMG.90
The Board of Directors.
Old. 
1. Board Meetings.  Boards meet quarterly, often with one board meeting held as a Afly 
89
.  Richard C. Breeden, Corporate Monitor, Restoring Trust, Report to Hon. Jed 
S. Rakeoff, United Sates District Judge, Southern District of New York, on Corporate 
Governance for the Future of MCI, Inc.  Unless otherwise noted, recommendations in 
the following text originated in Mr. Breeden=s report. 
90
.   See, e.g., Arshad Mohammed, ABulldog@ Breeden to Monitor Tax-Fraud 
Deal, Washington Post, Aug. 2005, at D1 (KPMG); Breeden is Tapped to Help Fannie 
Mae, Wall St. J., Jan. 28, 2005, at A1; and Geraldine Fabrikant, Investigator and 
Hollinger Chief Clash Over Paying $850,000, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 2004, at C4.
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away@ meeting at a resort or in a more distant city.  The corporation may have invited spouses.  
The meeting was often held as a planning meeting or strategic retreat.
2. Meeting Duration.  Meetings lasted 3-4 hours, often a morning or a morning and into the 
early afternoon.
3. Larger Boards.  The group may have consisted of 18, 21, or 24 directors.91  With a very 
large number, a group of inside directors, although less than a majority, could control the agenda, 
91
.   See, e.g,, RALPH D. WARD, 21ST CENTURY CORPORATE BOARD at 4 & 
198 (1997).  
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due to collection action problems which prevented the majority of independent directors from 
networking amongst themselves.92
Single Leader.  The same individual held, and insisted on holding, both the positions of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) a  Chairperson.  Proponents argue  that with s paration of the two offi es, two individuals would vie for a single position as lea er, to the detriment of thecompany.93
92
.  See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Rubber Stamp Is Tossed Aside by General Motors 
Board, New York Times, April 8, 1992, at A1 (lead by Alead@ director John Smale, 
former CEO of Proctor & Gamble, Inc.).
93
.  Len Boselovic, Companies Split About Separating CEO, Chairman=s Jobs, 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Mar. 16, 2004 at C9 (opposition of Professor Charles Elson to 
separation of positions).
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Board Composition: Several AIndependent@ Directors.  The corporation would recruit several directors free from any significant financial or familial ties to the senior managers.  Some companies included social t es s w ll.94  The ainder of directors would include the CEO, anothe  high ranki g manager or o (CFO, COO, Executive Vice President), the head of a prin ipal divisi n or subsidia y, or two, and ne or more Agray dir ct r ,@ s ch as a lawy r, merc al or nvest e t b nker h , whil  an ut id r, derived significa t rev nues from the rporation, either ire tly or th ugh h r f rm.95mitte s: Th  New York St ck Exch nge has requ d that l ste omp n  have an udit com ittee s ce 1977.96 Ea l r co porat s ut au h rized, a d rp tions had, only  x cut ve ommitt .  Th executive com ittee, c mpris d per ps of thre  insiders, h d el g ted to   full board=s p wers, s ve for mat ers ma  non- el gable by s at , b tweenme ing  of th  full b ard.  A  ab s was t ught o b  t at, so c n itute , an xecutive it e a ly cou d usurp  pr g tives and pow s of th  full b rd.  A o g moelab te c mitt e tr ctur , fina ce, pit l i v s ment, d s i l responsibility com it s r un d ut e c mmit e li up. I mor od n t , executiv commi te s hav  com  ar r d th  r quir d line p include  audi , nominating ( f n nomin t d over nc @ rA min ting and g v rnance@) d compensatio  c m itte s.97N w.
1. Board Meetings.  The full board should meet at least ten times per year.  On at least two 
of those occasions, the board should meet at a non-headquarters facility of the company.
2. Duration.  Board meetings should last a full day, or even two days.
3. Smaller Boards.  Mid cap company boards average 9 directors while Fortune 500
company boards average 10.9.98
94
.   The courts have not recognized a mere social tie as negating a director=s 
independence.  See, e.g., Odyessy Partners, L.P. v. Fleming Cos., Inc., 735 A.2d 386, 
409 (Del. Ch. 1999)(across the street neighbors).  Accord: ALI CORP. GOV. PROJ., 
Comment to ' 1.23 (definition of AInterested@), at 27 (AIt is not intended that a person 
would be treated as subject to a controlling influence, and therefore interested, solely 
because of a long-time friendship or other social relationship ....@).
95
.  In Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 
(E.D.N.Y. 1971), the court found a prestigious law firm attorney actually to have been 
an insider for purposes of securities law due diligence analysis.
96
.  The NYSE added a requirement for an audit committee to its listing 
standards in 1977.   See SEC Release No. 34-13,346 (March 9, 1977).
97
.  See ALI CORP. GOV. PROJ. ' 3.05 (AAudit Committee in Large Publicly 
Held Corporations@) & '' 3A.02-3A.05 (Audit, Nominating and Compensation 
Committees).
98
.   Average size today is 9.2 members overall and 10.9 members among 
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Fortune 500 companies.  The range is from 3 to 31 members.  Board Basics, Wall St. 
J., Oct. 27, 2003, at R7 (Table).
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4. Board Composition.  A majority of all directors should be independent.99  While SOX 
mandates that only audit committee members be independent,100 SROs such as the NYSE and 
NASDAQ require that a majority be independent.
5. Executive Sessions.  Each board meeting should have time reserved for an executive 
session at which no member of management, including the CEO, will be present.
6. Side Jobs.   Experts opine that by acceptance of consulting and similar arrangement 
directors forfeit a portion of their independence.  In the Senate Hearings on Enron, Professor 
Charles Elson of the University of Delaware testified that directors should have no financial ties 
99
.  Overall, 66 percent, and in the Fortune 500 seventy two percent, are 
independent.  Average tenure is 8.4 years, average age is 58.9 (59.9 in the Fortune 
500), and 10 percent are women.  Board Basics, supra note 97.
100
.  SOX ' 301.
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to the company whatsoever,@ other than directors= fees.  A[I]f a director=s role is as a consultant, 
hire hm as a consultant.  If a director=s role is to be a director, hire him as a director.  You cannot 
mix the two.@101
101
.  THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN ENRON=S COLLAPSE, 
Sen. Rep. 107-70, at 52-53 (2002).  Retired Sunoco board chair and CEO Robert 
Campbell gave similar testimony: Aconsulting arrangements with directors are 
absolutely incorrect, absolutely wrong.@ Id.
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At Enron, each and every director received consulting fees from the company in addition to their director ompensation.102  The NYSE limits side job compensation o $100,000 annually wh le the NASDAQ set thelimit at $60,000.103  Dir cto s who ac pt more may still s rve bu  they lose their status s Aindepend nt.@  Am ng oth r things, wing votes by hem ar  i effective a c urts w ll not cou t em to d termin  if a oard decisio  is entitle t  Aheight d b si ess judgem nt rul  protec ion.@104P oposed.1.
2. Yearly Strategic Planning Sessions.  Corporations should have as mandatory evolutions a 
plenary board meeting at which directors review all major areas of the corporation=s business.
3. Risk Management Committee.  Corporations should have a board committee whose role 
is constantly to assess exposure the company may have, legal, regulatory, and other, from its 
various businesses and which sees that the corporation complies with the law.
4. Boot Camp.  Corporate bylaws or governance guidelines must require that new directors 
attend and conduct refresher courses for all directors.  Among others, several graduate schools of 
business, such as those at Stanford and Indiana Universities, conduct multiple day short courses 
for corporate directors.105
102
.  Enron directors, or their firms, received consulting fees of $70,000 to 
$493,914 annually.  Enron made gifts of $500,000-600,000 to charities with which 
directors had close affiliations.  Other side payments occurred in one form or another as 
well.  See, id. at 51-52 (2002).
103
.  NYSE, NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL ' 303A.02(b)(ii)(Jan. 29, 2004); 
NASDAQ, Corporate Governance - Summary of Rule Changes (Rule 4200)(Nov. 4, 
2003).
104
.  Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
105
.  See Stanford Graduate School of Business, 
http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/exed/cgp/ (visited Nov. 21, 2005); Indiana University Kelley 
School of Business, http://kelley.iu.edu/kep/prod/progdetail.cfm?programid (visited Nov. 
21, 2005).
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5. Independent Director Certification.  Directors should undergo a training and testing 
process before they join boards.  Schemes in Australia and in East Asia have initiated, or 
discussed, initiation of certification requirements.106
106
.  Institute of Corporate Secretaries (Hong Kong), Professionalism or 
Incarceration - Will Future Directors Need To Be Accredited, Company Secretary, July, 
2004, at 6.  In the U.S. the National Association of Corporate Directors (NCD)  
maintains a registry of potential directors but does not certify them.  Blair & Bratton at 
86 (comments of Dr. Richard Raber, President and CEO, NACD).
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6. Term Limits.  Boards should enact limits of ten years or so and provide that at least one 
new director should be elected annually.  In the Aold@ days, board service of an individual lasting 
20-25 years was not uncommon.107
7. Elimination of Trophy Directors.108  Directors and director candidates should serve on no 
more than 2 or 3 additional boards.  Many corporate CEOs, long considered prime candidates for 
other corporations= boards of directors, no longer serve on any, or limit themselves to one, or are 
limited by contract, guideline, or bylaw, to one additional directorship.109
107
.  Ward (long board service)
108 See, e.g., Judith Dobrzynsky, When Directors Play Musical Chairs, Money & 
Business (Sunday), New York Times, Nov. 17, at 1996 (discussion of trophy directors).
109
.  Anita Raghavan, More CEOs Say >No Thanks= To Board Seats, Wall St. J., 
Jan. 28, 2005, at B1.
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8. Shareholder Nomination.  In 2005, SEC Chairman William Donaldson sought to have the 
Commission adopt a rule that would mandate authorization of nominations by institutional and 
similar large shareholders in cases in which given percentage of shareholders Awithhold 
authority@ for proxy votes, that is, for the corporate slate of directors.  The history of that 
proposal is beyond the scope of this article.110  Some good governance checklists imply that, on 
their own, corporations should provide a system for shareholder nominations.
9. Resignations.  Bylaws and employment contracts should provide that any resignation 
from a corporate office (CFO, COO) automatically constitutes a courtesy resignation from the 
board seat the corporate officer holds.111  In the WorldCom case, even after he had been revealed 
as the mastermind of a massive fraud and removed from his position as CFO, Scott Sullivan 
refused to resign his WorldCom board seat.
10. Independent Counsel.  The independent directors should have present in the boardroom, 
and the corporation should pay the fees of, an attorney whose role it is to represent the board 
110
.  The proposed SEC Rule 14a-11 (now withdrawn), Security Holder Director 
Nominations, is discussed in SEC Release No. 34-48626 (Oct. 14, 2003).
111
.  Susanne Craig, How One Firm Uses Strict Governance To Fix Its Troubles, 
Wall St. J., Aug. 23, 2003, A1, at A6.
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members in a day-to-day and meeting-to-meeting basis.112
Board Leadership.Old.
1. Board Chair.  This position was an empty vessel into which various corporations poured 
various things.  It had no legal status insofar as corporate statutes, old or new, as well as most 
corporate governance treatises, failed to mention it.113
112
.  Geoffrey Hazard, Jr. & Edward B. Rock, A New Player in the Boardroom: 
The Emergence of Independent Directors= Counsel, 59 Bus. Law. 1389, 1398-1412 
(2004).
113
.  One of the few sources is Australian: HENRY BOSCH, A.O., 
CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN CHAIRMEN (Australian Institute of Company Directors 
1999).
2. Honorary Position.  At many corporations, the position was, and remains, ceremonial, or 
largely so.  The chair presides at board meetings only, or at shareholders= meetings as well, or is 
also the primary liaison between directors and the corporation, or has charge of meeting agendas, 
or is the confidante of the CEO, or is both a right hand man and the confidante of the CEO.  
Corporate bylaws may spell out some but rarely all of these varying responsibilities.  At many 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
corporations, the CEO presides at shareholders= and even at directors= meetings.
3. Lead Directors.  Worldwide the trend is separation of the offices of CEO and Board 
Chair, rising to 95 or 100 percent of the corporations in some countries.  If the highest calling of 
modern boards is to evaluate and, if necessary, remove senior executives from office, most 
particularly the CEO, critics ask how a board can perform this function if the same person is both 
the CEO and calls the meetings and sets the agenda.  The U.S. partial answer has been to appoint 
a senior or capable person on the board as lead director who has the power to convene board 
meetings as well.  Although seemingly more corporations have separated the offices than 
discussion reveals,114 the formal U.S. answer remains appointment of a lead director.
New.
$ Formal Responsibilities.  Corporate bylaws or corporate governance 
guidelines should spell out in detail the Board Chair=s duties.
$ Minimum Responsibilities.  They would include; control of the agenda for 
meetings (annual, regular, and special); chairing both shareholders= and 
directors= meetings; coordination of the work of board committees; board packet 
114
.  Among the Fortune 200, non executive chair persons numbered 26 in 2000, 
and 27 in both 2001 and 2002, or approximately 13 percent.  Douglas M. Branson, The 
Board of Directors, WorldCom, Inc., Tabs 14, 15 and 16 (Aug., 2004).  The author 
served as the corporate governance expert for independent directors and the non-
executive board chairman in In re WorldCom Securities Litigation, Master File No. 2 
Civ. 3288 (DLC) (SDNY 2002), and, in that connection, complied data on the Fortune 
200.
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responsibility; coordination of board visits to company facilities; reviews of 
corporate ethics programs; conduct of annual reviews of board members; and 
organization of the formal annual CEO review process.
Proposed.
3. Mandatory Leadership Rotation.  The chair position should go to a new director at least 
every six years.
4. Office of Chairperson.  The corporation should provide a physical office and a staff 
appropriate to the position and its responsibilities.
5.  Annual Performance Reviews.  Staff, mangers and fellow directors must conduct annual 
360 degree reviews of the Board Chair.
The Audit Committee.Old.
1. Composition.  Independent directors staff the committee.  At least one member, and 
preferably more, have financial literacy, that is, they are familiar with financial statements, how 
they are prepared, and how outside accountants audit and certify them.115
115
.  As has been seen, the NYSE added a requirement for an audit committee to 
its listing standards in 1977.   See note 96 & accompanying text supra.
2.
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
Function.  The committee is of the board, comprised solely of board members, and with its primary or only responsibility to the board.116  Th  c mmittee is one additional structural device assuring the integri y of the financial infor a ion reaching the ful board andupon whic  it will evaluate the senior execut ves officers, ost par cul rly the CEO.
1. Meeting Frequency.  The committee meets with the corporation=s outside auditors before 
commencement of the annual audit, discussing the accountants= audit plan and pointing the 
auditors to problems areas or issues of which directors are aware.  Later, the committee conducts 
an exit interview with the auditors, asking for assessments of internal accounting and its 
personnel, and asking several questions about conduct of the audit.117  Acting as a focal point for 
116
.  See, e.g., Steigerwald v. A. M. Steigerwald Co., 9 Ill. App. 2d 31, 132 N.E.2d 
373 (1955). 
117
   One schematic required committees to ask 4 questions of the auditors: (1) 
Did you receive complete cooperation from everyone at our company?; (2) Did anything 
occur which caused you to deviate from our agreed upon audit plan?; (3) Is there any 
matter that you believe the full board of directors should be advised about?; and (4) Are 
you -  you personally - prepared to, and do you, endorse these audit results?  See, e.g., 
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discussion of accounting issues, the committee meets perhaps one or two other times per year.
2. Meeting Duration.  Traditionally, audit committees conducted their meetings before the 
full board met, at, say, 7:00 or 7:30 AM if the full board were to convene at 9:00.  Accordingly, 
many audit committee meetings would last between one and two hours.
New.
HENRY BOSCH, AO, CONVERSATIONS WITH A NEW DIRECTOR at 43-45 
(Australian Institute of Company Directors, 1997).
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64
1. Composition.  Sox mandates that the audit committee be comprised exclusively of independent directors, defined so as to exclude professionals or others whos  firms derive any com sation from the corporation.118
2. Expertise.  At least one member must be a financial expert, the definition of which SOX 
delegates to the SEC.  The SEC defines an expert as one who has hands-on experience in the 
auditing of publicly held companies.
3.
Meeting Frequency.  Committees are to meet more often than 3 or 4 times per year.  In 2002, the year i  which Congress enac ed SOX, audit committees a  Fortune 200 cor orations met an av age of 7.8 times, with both a medi n and a mode of 7 times.119
2. Hotline Responsibility.  SOX requires the audit committee to put in place and supervise 
mechanisms whereby anyone in the organization can report to and obtain the ear of those at the top 
regarding financial or accounting irregularities.120
118
.  SOX ' 301.  The old rules and some of the proposed new ones are described 
and analyzed in Helen Scott, The SEC, the Audit Committee, and the Marketplace: 
Corporate Governance and the Future, 79 Wash. U. L. Q. 549 (2001).  See also Peter 
M. Collins, Outside Counsel: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Creates a New Role for the Audit 
Committee, 228 N.Y. L.J., Oct. 17, 2002, at 4; Erica Beecher-Monas, Corporate 
Governance in the Wake of Enron: An Examination of the Audit Committee Solution to 
Corporate Fraud, 55 Admin. L. Rev. 357 (2003).
119
.  Douglas M. Branson, The Board of Directors, WorldCom, Inc., supra note, 
Tab 20 (Aug., 2004).  The related numbers for 2000 were a mean and a median of 5 
times with a mode of 4 times, id., Tab 18, and for 2001 were a mean of 5.379, a median 
of 5.0, and a mode of 4, id., at Tab 19. 
120
.   See Marc I. Steinberg & Seth A. Kaufman, Minimizing Corporate Liability 
Exposure When the Whistle Blows in the Post Sarbanes-Oxley Era, 30 J. Corp. L. 445 
(2005).
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3. Reporting Up Receptacle.  In addition to being a hotline receptacle, the audit committee 
acts as an alternative receptacle for attorney reports of evidence of Asecurities law violations and 
similar misconduct@ within the organization.  SOX section 307 reports that an attorney may make 
reports to the audit committee or full board, in lieu of reports to the Chief Legal Officer (CLO) or 
CEO.121
Proposed.
2. Meeting Frequency.  The audit committee should meet at least eight times per year and 
more frequent meetings may be advisable.
3. Duration.  One, two or perhaps even three hour meetings are insufficient.  Meeting should 
last at least one half day, or longer.
4. Chair Rotation.  The board should rotate the chair position on the committee at least  once 
every three years.
5. Interested Director and Officer Transactions.  The committee should review the 
documentation regarding such transactions, including, for example, flight logs and similar records 
to police director use of the corporation=s personal and real property.122
121
.  SOX ' 307.
122
.  The ALI Corporate Governance Project provided that, in order to free up 
board members from such tasks, which can become mundane, the board (or 
shareholders) could pass a resolution and thereafter such tasks could be delegated to a 
corporate manger who would be free of all conceivable conflicts of interest in the matter.  
ALI CORP. GOV. PROJ. '' 1.36 & 5.09 (AStandard of the Corporation@ and AEffect of a 
Standard of the Corporation@).
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6. Special Meetings.  At least annually, the committee should meet with interested 
shareholders, securities analysts, and other observers for an accounting and Adisclosure review.@
7. CFO Review.  The committee is to conduct an annual review of the CFO=s performance as 
well as her personal finances and in order to be able to enforce an absolute prohibition on outside 
income or activities by the CFO (an Enron-Fastow provision).
8. Annual Training.  Audit committee members must undergo an initial and then annual 
refresher training course.  Such a course should cover accounting principles, auditing standards, 
ethical compliance, and the pronouncements of FASB and PCAOB.  The courses should introduce 
students to nomenclature and analytical tools such as WACC (weighed average cost of capital) and 
EBITA (earnings before interest, taxes and amortization).
Accountants.
$ Although the number ebbs and flows, almost on a daily basis,123 there are 
approximately 15,000 corporations which file periodic reports with the SEC.  In 
2002 Big 4 firms124 audited 79 percent of them and 97 percent of the companies 
with revenues which exceed $250, million, as follows: PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
123
.    As of adoption of SOX, approximately 16,200 public companies filed periodic 
reports with the SEC, see SEC, Framework for Enhancing the Quality of Financial 
Information, 67 Fed. Reg., at 44,999 (July 5, 2002), although the number constantly 
changes.  See, e.g., ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, 
UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW at 150 & n. 19 (2d ed. 2004).
124
.  Sometimes referred to as the AFinal Four.@ See Frank Partnoy, Strict Liability 
for Gatekeepers: A Reply to Professor Coffee, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 365, 368 (2004).
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34%; Deloitte & Touche, 24 %; Ernst & Young, 23 %; and KPMG, 18%.125
Eighteen other accounting firms (the Aintermediate 18"), including some that are 
quite large, such as BDO and Grant Thorton, audit public companies.  Some audit 
a few while others audit a number but no firm outside the Big 4 audits more than 
100.
$ SOX creates an independent, quasi governmental corporation, the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), with which accountants must 
register if they audit one or more publicly held corporations.126  Under SOX, the 
PCAOB is to audit annually firms which audit more than 100 clients.  It is to audit 
other accounting firms at least every 3 years.  PCAOB also issues guidance to 
accountants as, for example, PCAOB did in Audit Standard No. 2, a voluminous 
guideline concerning installation and documentation of internal controls.127
125
.  General Accounting Office, Report to the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs, APublic Accounting Firms: Mandated Study on Consolidation 
and Competition@ (July 2003).  See also SOX ' 701  (Mandating the study and ensuing 
report to Congress).
126
.  SOX ' 101.
127
.  Alan Carpenter, FEI Provides Best Practices, BNA Fed. Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 
No. 37-21, at 920 (May 23, 2005).  Audit Standard No. 2 (AS2) is titled AAn Audit of 
Internal Control Over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction with An Audit of 
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Financial Statements.@  The PCAOB has issued a number of question and answer 
publications and other forms of guidance for companies and for accountants.
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art37
$ As of November, 2004, 1,378 accounting firms had registered with PCAOB, 
of which 499 are foreign based firms.  One reason for the high number of 
registration is that each office of a large firm registers.  Thus the Big 4 plus BDO 
and Grant Thorton alone account for approximately 232 registrations.128
New.
4. Registration.  As aforesaid, accounting firms which audit so much as one public company 
must undergo screening and then have a registration accepted by the PCAOB.129
5. Audits of Auditors.  The PCAOB will conduct inspections of registrants.
6. Off Books Entities.  SOX and the SEC require regulated corporations to make disclosures 
128
.  George Goodman, Better Governance and Reporting Under Sarbanes-Oxley: 
Are We There Yet?, BNA Fed. Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 36-46, 2074, at 2076 (Nov. 22, 
2004).
129
.  In the process, PCAOB rejected registrations by 3 accounting firms.  Id. at 
2078.
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of off  balance sheet arrangements such as those Enron employed with its special purpose 
entities.130  Concurrently, the Financial Accounting Standards Board has tightened the rules, 
requiring financial statement disclosure on SPE=s if the corporation is a Aprime beneficiary@ of the 
arrangement, however contrived.131  The change represents a shift from the bright line accounting 
rules under which Enron operated, requiring 3 percent of capital from an independent source and 
governance of the entity to be independent as well.
130
.  SOX ' 401(a).
131
.  Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) No. 46 (Jan. 2003).
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7. Cost.  In addition to payment of $6-7 million in annual SOX 404 attestation and other 
costs, publicly held corporations must pay an annual levy to fund PCAOB.  The formula is 
simple.  Corporations are responsible for annual payments according to the fraction their market 
capitalization bears to the market capitalization of all firms.  Large publicly held firms pay as 
much as $2 million annually.132
Proposed.
1. Financial Statement Insurance.  Corporations could obtain coverage after insurance 
companies conduct their own audit, or mini audit, in order to determine premium amounts.  The 
insurer would then select the firm to do the audit.133  The proposal=s main feature is to 
eliminate the conflict of interest in which the company to be audited chooses and 
then pays the firm it selects to examine its financial statements.  A disadvantage 
is the high premium that corporations might have to pay, the amount of which 
come more to light in the more recent Marsh & McLennan and AIG scandals.134
132
.   See Alison Carpenter, PCAOB Approves $103 million Budget for 2004, with 
Focus on Inspections, BNA Fed. Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 35-47, at 2065 (Dec. 8, 
2003).  SOX ' 109 delegates to PCAOB the power to set funding levels and payment 
responsibilities.
133
.   Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial 
Statement Insurance Alternative to Auditor Liability, 52 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 413 (2004); 
Joshua Ronen, Post-Enron Reform: Financial Statement Insurance and GAAP 
Revisited, 8 Stan. J. L. Bus. & Fin. 39 (2002).  
134
.  See Diane Brady & Marcia Vickers, AIG: What Went Wrong?, Business 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
Another question is why insurances have not previously written such coverage 
into Director and Officer (D & O) policies.135
Week, April 11, 2005, at 32 (exorbitant premiums for Aearnings insurance@ and other 
coverages); Ian McDonald & Monica Langley, AIG Expected to Pay $1 billion-Plus to 
Settle Probes, Wall St. J., January 13, 2006, at A4.
135
.  Former SEC Commissioner Joseph A. Grundfest has asked these 
questions.  See Grundfest, Punctuated Equilibria in the Evolution of United Sates 
Securities Regulation, 8 Stan. J. L. Bus. & Fin. 1, 7-8 (2002)(AD & O insurers today 
could easily make retention of insurer approved auditors a condition of coverage.  They 
could today also require an element of control over the audit process.  Yet they don=t@).
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2. Financial Statement Reliability Indexes.  Corporations would have to disclose a numerical 
ranking, or the rank of the tranche in which evaluators had placed the company=s financial 
statements.  Moody=s, Standard & Poors=, and other rating agencies, which have made forays into 
corporate governance,136 might compile such indexes.  The existence of financial statement 
insurance might aid them.  The index assigned might correlate closely with the amount of premium 
paid for, say, each $10 million in revenues.
136
.  See note 80-81 & accompanying text supra.
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3. Installation of Early Warning Accounting Systems.  In truth, SOX, along with Auditing 
Standard No. 2, already incorporate an early warning system.  ATraditional auditing begins with an 
auditor assessing a company=s internal control environment.@137  That task gives the auditor an 
early indication of the reliability of financial statements the client company has provided.  By 
requiring auditors to undertake that process, and disclose the results to investors and others, SOX, 
auditors, and the section 404 attestation process combine to enable insiders and outsiders to gauge 
at an early point the reliability of financial statements.138
137
.  See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Facilitating Auditors= New Early Warning 
System: Controls Disclosure, Auditor Liability, and Safe Harbors, 55 Hastings L. J. 1449, 
1450 (2004).
138
.  See AUDITING STANDARD No. 2, at app.& 6 (A[i]nformation on internal 
control over financial reporting is .. intended to provide an early warning to those inside 
and outside the company who are in a position to insist on improvements@).
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In performing the task, however, the auditor must speak out on the subject of internal controls.  By doing o, e b comes a prima y rather than sec dary violator of the securities law.  Since Central Bank of D nver139 elimin ed aiding a  abetting liability, plaintiffs enc unter extr me difficulty i  r ac ing secondary defendants, diff culty which is absent in r ach ng the po kets of primary violators.  To f n  tu  the arly w rning syst m, nd to come clo r to n Aadv s ri l audit,@he law should Ad v l p saf  h rbor pro ctions f r f rw d-lo k g auditor st m nts regardi g [int nal] co r l ... hat parallel exi ting s fe rb rsf r issu rs.@  Genera ly, he s e ha bor for f rward l oking stat men  whichPrivate Securitie Li igation Ref r Act introduce in 1995140 do no  ap y to st t m s audit rs mig t ake.141  Audi ors sho l  be l tore ort h ir find ng  r gardi g int rnal nt ols with ut fe r of li bil ty.142
139
.  Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 
U.S. 164 (1994).
140
.   Codified as Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ' 21(E)(a), 15 U.S.C. 77z-
2(i)(I)(2004)(certain statements, when Aaccompanied by meaningful cautionary 
language,@ are deemed froward looking).
141
.  See Cunningham, supra note 136, at 1481.
142
.  Professor Cunningham also finds that the emphasis on internal controls only 
Apartially succeeds as an early warning system.@  Cunningham, supra note 136, at 1490.  
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SOX seems to regard internal controls as Aan end in itself@ when errors of judgment, 
estimation, or preparation may also render financial statements misleading.  See 
generally id. 1487-90 (AA Different Warning: Control Worship@).
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4. Choice of Auditors By Lot.  In reality, the leading piece contains two different proposals, 
with the co-authors airing the differences between them and their proposals.143  They both 
address the same problem, namely, that the corporation which is responsible for 
financial statements, through its self-interested managers, selects and later 
compensates the accounting firm which is to vouch for the statements= reliability. 
AIt is as though baseball pitchers called their own balls and strikes and then hired 
umpires to verify their calls.@144
143
.  David B. Kahn & Gary S. Lawson, Who=s the Boss?: Controlling Auditor 
Incentives Through Random Selection, 53 Emory L. J. 391, 414 (2004).
144
.  Id. at 393.  See generally Sean O=Connor, Be Careful What You Wish For: 
How Accountants and Congress Created the Problem of Auditor Independence, 45 B.C. 
L. Rev. 741 (2004).
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Corporations could voluntarily make the relationship less cozy and more advers r al but they would have difficulty communicating to the world that theirs was different fr m ot er company-audit r relatio hips, or in getting  ublic to b lieve them.  Ind ed, the  might ev n attem t to do so, for it w uld in reas  t reliability of financial informatio nd lower the c st ofcapital.145One w y to p t q isite dist nce between comp y and auditor and to ommu cate w th cr di woul  be to sel ct audi or  by lotte y.  The Kahn m th d w uld r qui  comp nies to s l ct fro a po l of p tentialud s.146  A p blic versight b ard (the SEC, the PCAOB, or he like)overs e t  p s, incl ing fixi g t e =s c mp sat on. The r st f the pr gram w uld be Ato educe th  ext t o w ic  auditor  eed o worry ab ut pl sing the man g m n o  c mpani  t ey au it @147Th  Law n lo y pr po al br c s cont act, r th r than  regu atoryp r ch.  Th com any would Asel c at r ndom from am ng  auditing fir  th  x ress a illi gn ss t  a p h  g ge nt a specifi d p ic .@148 If t  p st d ric  o not ttrac   riti l m ss  th  c pa y l  v  o ai e its off ri g pric .  T  the ex ent versigh is e s ry (f r xample, det r ining if the p l w r a r a nabl  ize), ock ex ng s or ot r SRO  would uppl  i .149
145
.  Id. at 399-402.
146
.  Id. at 414-17 (Donald Kahn is a co-author of the proposal(s)).
147
.  Id. at 415
148
.  Id. at 417 (Gary Lawson is the other co-author).
149
.  In the past, there have been proposals that government should supply 
auditors.  See, e.g., Mark A. Gullotta, The SEC=s Auditor Independence Rule: Missing the 
Boat on Auditor Independence, 42 Santa Clara L. Rev. 221, 224 (2001).  See also
Jenkins, supra note , at A17 (A[T]he SEC should contract directly with accounting firms to 
audit books of companies that want to raise money in the public markets@).
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5. Mandatory Rotation of Auditing Firms.  SOX requires that corporations rotate the Aaudit 
partner@ and the Aengagement partner@ assigned to it at least every five years.150  Some original 
SOX proposals required a mandatory change of auditing firms, although the 
proposals did not survive in the final legislation.  Nonetheless, commentators 
believe that best practices should dictate that firms change auditing firms at least 
every five years.151
6. Contractual Liability Caps.  In engagement agreements they sign with client corporations, 
accounting forms now include provisions for alternative dispute resolution (binding arbitration), 
elimination of punitive damages, and a cap on compensatory damages the auditor may be adjudged 
150
.  SOX ' 203.  Cf. John Plender, Don=t Be Fooled By the Rotating Audit Partner, 
Financial Times, July 29,2002, at 12.   SOX also contains a Arevolving door= provision 
which requires a one year minimum period before an auditor may assume an executive 
position (CEO, CFO, comptroller, etc.) with a corporation whose financial statements she 
has audited.  SOX ' 206.
151
.  See, e.g., John Kroger, Enron, Fraud, and Securities Reform: An Enron 
Prosecutor=s Perspective, 76 Col. L. Rev. 57, 135-137 (2005).  Fortune 1000 firms retain 
the same audit firm for 22 years, on average.  GAO, A Public Accounting Firms; Required 
Study on the Effects of Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation,@ GAO-04-216, at 6 (2003)
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to owe the client.152   Post SOX, Big 4 accounting firms have been insistent on these type terms.  
The auditors= liability, or lack thereof, to third party investors remains unaffected, as the contract 
can only affect the relationship between the auditor and the client corporation.153
152
.  See Michael Rapoport, Auditing >Liability Caps= Face Fire, Wall St. J., Nov. 28, 
2005, at C3.
153
.  Douglas M. Branson, Collateral Participant Liability Under the Securities Laws: 
Charting the Proper Course, 65 Ore L. Rev. 327, 338-41 (1986).
7. Combinations.   None of the proposals is mutually exclusive, except perhaps for the 
financial statement insurance proposal.  A hypothetical corporation could purchase insurance, at 
least in some forms, choose its auditor by lot, agree to liability caps, install an early warning 
system, disclose a financial statement reliability index, and rotate its outside auditing firm 
periodically.  The cost, while not insignificant, would not be prohibitive, or would not be 
prohibitive if the corporation omitted the purchase of financial statement insurance.
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8. Strict Liability or Warranty Accounting.  At present, absent contract, auditors may be liable 
to the auditing client for malpractice.154  Their liability to third parties, most particularly to 
investors, is more problematic.  In most jurisdictions, the accountant will be liable to those who are 
the very Aend and aim@ of the transaction,155 and, under Restatement of Torts section 552, to 
foreseen but not to foreseeable parties.156  With the Supreme Court=s elimination of federal 
securities law aiding and abetting, investors have had difficulty holding accountants liable,157
although, as Professor Lawrence Cunningham has pointed out, this may change as accountants 
attest to the efficacy of internal controls under SOX section 404.158  In the post SOX era, a number 
of proposers seek to change all of this, replacing the scheme with potentially more expansive 
154
.  Id.
155
.  Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 238-39, 135 N.E. 275, 276 
(1922)(Cardozo, J.), coined the term.
156
.   See, e.g., Abrams Center Nat. Bank v. Farmer, Fuqua & Huff, P.C.,   S.W.3rd 
 , 2005 WL 2806211 (TX App. at El Paso, Oct. 27, 2005)(accountants not liable because 
bank was merely a foreseeable rather than a foreseen user of financial statements); 
Branson, supra note 152, at 339-40.e
157
.  See note 138 & accompanying text supra.
158
.  Cunningham, supra note 136, at 1475.
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accountants= liability.
Borrowing from a concept originally advanced at, and incorporated by, the American Law Institute, but implemented by only  few states, ALI report r Professor John Coffe  would hold accou tants strictly liable but would capthe amount f liability at a multip e of the an u l rev nues he cc ntant de ived from an udit clien .  Pr f ssor Coff e proposes Ato con ert the gat keeper into the functional equiv lent f an insur r, wh w uld back itsauditor=s ce tific tion with an insuranc p licy that was cap d as a re l stic level.@159  Regul rs ould ov rsee th  proc s.H king back  prop sal mad  ear i r,160 Profess r Fr nk P rtn y espou es a co trac l ystem wh reby untants wou d agre o be st ic ly liabl  f r er n g  of t tal d mag .  Hi  yst m, which would r sult in r te li bility, d p s ibly f b krup cie fr m time to m ,161w d al  have he s me h lm k s Pr s o  C ff e= pr po al. Thh llmark is sub tit tio  f strict li bili  f r ystem base  u fault, thatis, a finding t at in p rf rmi g a it  accountant  ha  b en negligent, u u ly  f iling t  x r  the due lig n e th  l w r qui es.162
9. Criminalize Accountant Negligence.  Still another proposal retains liability based upon 
159
.  Coffee, supra note 8, at 349.
160
.  Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified 
Strict Liability Regime, 79 Wash. U. L. Q. 491, 540 (2001).
161
.  See Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers: A Reply to Professor Coffee, 84
BU. L. Rev. 365, 366 (2004).
162
.  See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
916, 918-919 (1998).
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fault, but would criminalize a portion of it under Aa new federal statute making [accountant 
misconduct] a misdemeanor, punishable by up to one year in jail.@163  The author, a former 
Enron prosecutor, points out that A[e]very legal system in world criminalizes at least 
some types of negligent conduct to protect important interests in life, limb and 
property.@164   He believes that criminalization is essential to create incentives for 
auditors to take reasonable care in the conduct in which they are paid to engage.
163
.  Kroger, supra note , at 131 (footnote omitted).
164
.  Id. at 130 (footnote omitted).
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10. Fewer Criminal and Civil Proceedings.  In its report, AAuditing: A Profession at Risk,@165
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce calls for diversion of all or most disputes to Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) and regulation of the ability to indict accounting firms in criminal matters.166
Attorneys.
$ Reporting Up.  SOX section 307 has as a trigger receipt of evidence of a Amaterial violation
of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by a company or any agent 
thereof.@167  Upon receipt, the attorney is to report up either to the Chief Legal Officer 
(CLO) or the CEO.  Failing appropriate action by them, the attorney is to blow the 
whistle to either the audit committee, the independent directors, or the full board. 
The SEC may censure, suspend or revoke the privilege of practice before it of any 
attorney who fails to comply.  Much has been written about the section, most of 
which is beyond the scope of this article.168
165
.  Available at http://www.uschamber.com (Last visited February 26, 2006)
166
.  See U.S. Chamber Calls for Reform to Make Industry More Competitive, 
Viable, BNA Fed. Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 38-5, at 183 (Jan. 30, 2006).
167
.  SOX ' 307.
168
.  See, e.g., Roger Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on 
Legal and Ethics Issues, 58 Bus. Law. 143 (2002); Richard Painter, Convergence and 
Competition in the Rules Governing Lawyers and Accountants, 29 J. Corp. L. 397 (2005); 
Susan Koniak See also Otis Bilodeau, Pinter=s Putsch; Richard Painter Argued for Years 
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that Corporate Law Needed Policing. Enron Gave Him His Opening, 25 Legal Times, at 
21 (Dec. 23, 2002); Anthony Lin, Crusader Says Year-Old Reform Is Working, 230 New 
York L.J. 1 (July 31, 2003).
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$ Past History.  In SEC v. National Student Marketing,169 the SEC contended 
that, faced with suspicious accounting irregularities, lawyers from two prestigious 
law firms should have resigned and blown the whistle to the SEC.  Instead, the 
lawyers accepted the explanations the clients proffered, closing the merger.  
Judge Parker found that the lawyers had violated the law but refused to grant the 
injunction the SEC requested.  Many chalked National Student Marketing and the 
arguments for attorney whistle blowing up to SEC zeal and the Post Watergate 
morality which pervaded the country at the time.
169
.  457 F. Supp. 682 (D. D.C. 1976).
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art37
A few years later, in a 2(e) rules of practice disciplinary proceeding, the full Commission did uphold an int rnal whistle blow ng requirem nt for lawyers who practice b fore the SEC.  The Alawyer must tak  f rther, moreaffirmative steps,@ such s A[a] dir ct pproach to th board of r ctors o  on  or more in ividu  director  r officers.@170 Al hough SEC never the eaf r i sisted upon wh stl  blo ing by ttor eys, inte nal or t rw e,171 pr sum bly a percentage of them did o in o e m or ther.Prop s d.
170
.   In re Carter, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ' 82,847 (Feb. 
28, 1981).
171
.  In a 1982 speech, the SEC General Counsel stated that the SEC would not 
do so unless a court had adjudicated that the attorney had violated the securities laws.  
Edward R. Greene, Remarks to the New York County Lawyers= Assn., [1982 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ' 83,089, at 84,802 (Jan. 18, 1982).  But see In re 
Gutfreund, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ' 85,067 (Dec. 3, 1992).
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Qualified Legal Compliance Committees (QLLCs).  SOX 307 set off a whirlwind of 
lawyer criticism.172  Experienced directors thought that boards and board 
committees were even less likely to welcome a lawyer into the room or make 
material disclosures to her knowing that the lawyer has a legal duty to report up 
any evidence of wrongdoing she might perceive to exist.  One little noticed partial 
response has been to change the party to whom the lawyer must report.  By rule, 
the SEC has authorized a third way, introducing the QLLC as a Amechanism for 
reporting, as well as investigating and responding to, misconduct.@173
Board members may not perceive the QLLC as an answer.  Even before 
SOX, many directors and students of governance felt that law and best 
practices blueprints combine to over burden board committees.  Post-SOX, 
with overwhelming responsibilities imposed by law on audit committees 
and a welter of additional responsibilities proposed upon nominating, 
172
.   See, e.g., Roger Cramton, George M. Cohen & Susan P. Koniak, Legal and 
Ethical Duties After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 Vill. L. Rev. 725 ((2004).  See also Cohen, 
Cramton & Koniak, The Defective Trigger of the SEC=s Rule Implementing SOXA=s Duty 
to Report, BNA Fed. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 37-3, at 108 (Jan. 17, 2005); C. Evan Stewart, 
Holding Lawyers Accountable in the Post-Enron Feeding Frenzy, Id., No. 34-38, at 
1587 (Sept. 30, 2002).
173
.  Fisch & Gentile, supra note 10, at 523 (introducing SEC Rule 205).
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governance and other committees, as a matter of best practices, many 
believe that Athis committee thing has gone too far.@  Committees and 
committee responsibilities take directors away from monitoring and 
strategic planning exercises regarded as attorneys= highest and best uses, 
especially considering the part time nature of directors= positions.  The 
QLLC is Ajust one more@ (Ayet another independent board committee@).174
174
.  Fisch & Gentile, supra note 10, at 540.
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Attorneys may have a opposing view, preferring creation and use of a QLLC. 
 Bylaw or corporate governance guideline consignment of SOX section 307 
reporting up responsibilities to a QLLC may relieve attorneys from over 
entanglement in possible wrongdoing.  Lawyers, especially those from elite 
law firms, will be better able to concentrate on the Aprocess@ and 
Atransaction@ engineering they regard as their best use.  AAttorneys, 
especially those at elite law firms, may refuse engagements with issuers who 
do not have QLLCs.@175
Despite the widespread belief that use of board committees has already 
extended far beyond its usefulness, the SEC affirmatively Aencourages 
issuers to create [QLLCs] as a means of effective corporate governance.@176
Perhaps blissfully unaware of the burdens it is imposing, the SEC requires 
that one of the QLLCs three members also be a member of the audit 
committee.177
3. Noisy Withdrawals.  Newly invigorated by SOX, some said, the SEC implemented SOX 
section 307 by including within its proposed rules provision for noisy withdrawals.  Having 
175
.  Fisch & Gentile, supra note 10, at 550-51.
176
.  SEC Release No. 34-47,276, [2002-03 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) '  86,802, at 87,083 (Jan. 29, 2003)(adopting release).
177
.  Id. at 87,089.
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reported evidence of wrongdoing, and determining that corporate officials had not taken 
appropriate action, an attorney could insulate himself by ceasing the representation and notifying 
others, including the SEC, that he had done so.178
178
.  See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, SEC 
Release No. 33-8150 (Dec. 2, 2002); SEC Release No. 33-8185 (Jan. 29, 2003)(adopted 
without SEC=s attorney noisy withdrawal SOX ' 307 safe harbor proposal).
To critics, the noisy withdrawal is tantamount to the whistle blowing 
responsibility the SEC attempted for foist upon attorneys in the 1976 
National Student Marketing, at least by the back door.  Due to the noise 
involved, in cases of withdrawal, onlookers, including prosecutors and 
regulators, would ask questions. Questions might well bring wrongdoing to 
light.  The fact of withdrawal then might lead to prosecution or enforcement 
action.
Bending but not bowing to cries that the SEC had exceeded any authority 
SOX 307 had bestowed upon the Commission, the SEC did not include the 
noisy withdrawal safe harbor in the final version of Rule 205.  The 
Commission, however, still keeps noisy withdrawal proposals, or narrower 
versions thereof, it its desk drawer.
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3 Separate Counsel for Independent Directors.  Two eminent academics have 
proposed that at major corporations, independent directors have their own lawyer 
going forward, and on a permanent basis.179  When academics pose structural 
improvements such as this,180  the considerable out-of-pocket cost aside, most 
business persons do not want to see lawyers as central players in the boardroom.  
Lawyers tend to see legal issues, often with potential liability, lurking in every nook 
and cranny. If an attorney acting alone tends to be too risk averse, two attorneys in 
the boardroom would compound the problem.  In a sizeable subset of cases, 
attorneys would engage in one ups man ship, each attempting to demonstrate to 
the board that he has the right stuff.  Such a rivalry would obfuscate rather than 
clarify legal aspects of doing business.  On a more rarefied plane, at least in 
Delaware corporate jurisprudence, the standard of care and the business judgment 
rule, and the protection they afford to directors, make it unnecessary to have a 
second attorney, representing independent directors, in the boardroom.181
179
.  Hazard & Rock, supra note 111, at 1395-96.
180
.  See generally Hazard & Rock, supra note 111, at 1406.
181
.  See E. Norman Veasey, Separate and Continuing Counsel for Independent 
Directors: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come as a General Practice, 59 Bus. Law. 
1413, 1413-14 (2004).  Former (Delaware) Chief Justice Veasey identifies six situations 
in which corporate provision of separate counsel would be appropriate, namely Awhere
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The Nominating, or Governance, Committee.
Old.
(I) an independent committee, such as an audit or compensation committee, has a 
tradition of having its own regular, outside counsel ...; (ii) the [corporate] general 
counsel has a real or perceived conflict; (iii) the board or committee believes that 
has a need to explore independently something that appears questionable; (iv) a 
special investigation; (v) the need for a particular legal expertise; (vi) simply - to 
invoke a medical analogy - the board or committee seeks a Asecond opinion.@
Id. at 1417.
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$ The primary purpose of such a committee was to take the process of 
developing board candidates out of the CEO=s hands, in which the power had 
traditionally been lodged.182   The committee thus would reinforce board 
independence.  Creation of committee had as a corollary purpose 
encouragement of board diversity, that is, addition to the board of persons of 
color, women, and others historically under represented on the board.
$ Even after the nominating committee had become widespread, certain 
CEOs continued to subvert committees and their work.  For example, CEOs 
Wayne Andreas at Archer-Daniels Midland (ADM) and Bernie Ebbers at 
WorldCom insisted upon CEO nominating committee membership. In Decatur, 
Illinois, according to wags, ADM referred to the board of directors, AAll Dwayne=s 
Men.@  In the 1980s and 1990s, in many instances (American Express, Sunbeam, 
Scott Paper, Archer Daniels Midland, Morrison Knudsen), CEOs were able to 
coopt or end run nominating committees, remolding or reshaping boards of 
directors themselves, thus postponing a comeuppance for CEO under 
performance or wrongdoing.  A properly functioning governance and nominating 
committee would have prevented illicit board molding.
New.
3. Nominations.  The committee, and not the CEO,  should be responsible for committee as 
well as board nominations.
182
.   ALI CORP. GOV. PROJ., Comment to ' 3A.04, at 124-25.
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4. Rotation of Committee Chairs.  Rotation should be mandatory.  The nominating 
committee implements and enforces the provision.
5. Board Leadership.  The Committee, and not the CEO, identifies and nominates persons 
for the board chair position.
6. Committee Charters.  The nominating, or governance, committee oversees the adoption 
and the periodic updating of charters, which all board committees must have.
7. Organic Corporate Documents.  The committee recommends and oversees the process of 
amendment of the articles of incorporation and bylaws.
Proposed.1 Indepen ence.  The committee should define independence and monitor the same on an ongoing basis.183.
2. Separation of Offices.  The committee should pull the laboring oar on the periodic 
discussion that offices of chair and CEO be separate and on appointment of a lead directors if the 
same individual remains both Chair and CEO.
3. Executive Sessions of the Board.  Again, the enforcer should be the nominating, or 
governance, committee.
2. Risk Management Functions (assigned to a separate risk management committee on some 
corporate boards):
183
.  Chief Justice Veasey would assign 16 discrete responsibilities to the 
nominating, or governance, committee, including those discussed in text.  See Veasey, 
supra note 178, at 1415-16.
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- Develop and monitor law compliance systems.insure compliance with a business code of ethics
3. Periodically evaluate board schedules, quality of board meetings, and workloads of 
committees and individual directors.
4. Disclosure Documents.  The committee superintends director responsibility for 
documents, or portions of them.
5. Conflicts of Interest The committee has the responsibility to call attention to and deal 
with interested director, corporate opportunity, and other duty of loyalty issues.
6. Insider Trading.  The committee has a similar responsibility with regard to these types of 
issues.
7. Succession Planning.  The committee must have in effect plans not only for the CEO and 
for members of the board but for key corporate officers as well.
8. Evaluations.  The committee maintains and is otherwise in charge of the evaluation 
process for directors, the board, and board committees.
9. Shareholder Relations.  The committee is charged with oversight over effective 
shareholder relations and communications.
10. Electronic Town Meetings.  The governance committee should establish and maintain a 
website on which any one percent shareholder would be entitled to post ideas and resolutions, but 
not be subject to screening of the type corporations currently undertake with shareholder public 
interest proxy proposals.184
11. Disclosure Committee.  The governance committee should set up a disclosure committee 
184
.  See SEC Rule 14a-8, Question 9 (i)(1-13)(possible exclusions from 
corporate proxy statements).
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comprised of directors, members of senior management, and outside advisers, including, 
possibly, securities analysts.
Compensation Committee
This committee, comprised of independent directors, while becoming 
commonplace185 in corporations, generally has been acceded to be a failure.  
CEO compensation has run rampant in the U.S.  In 1990, Greaf Crystal estimated 
CEO compensation to be 16 times that of the average worker in Japan, 21 times 
in Germany, and 160 times in the U.S.186 By 2000, Crystal put the number Anorth 
of 400 times and heading rapidly to 500 times.@187  The committee has not 
checked this rapid rise on compensation or otherwise worked well for several 
reasons.  
One is that, advised by lawyers, and perhaps seeking the safe harbor 
protection of the business judgment rule, committees often hire
compensation consultants.188 Consultants use a quartile method of 
185
.  ALI CORP. GOV. PROJ. ' 3A.05 (ACompensation Committee in Large 
Publicly Held Corporations: Composition, Powers, and Functions@).
186
.  GREAF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH IF EXCESS: THE 
OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMERICAN EXECUTIVES 205-09 (1991).
187
.   Kathleen Day, Soldiers for the Shareholder, Washington Post, Aug. 27, 
2000, at H1.
188
.  See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 2005 WL 296661, Slip 
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comparison.  Even though those type systems have had their obvious 
inadequacies highlighted,189 compensation committees and consultants 
continue to use them.  The result, because four quartiles of companies 
almost all want their top executives= compensation to be in the highest 
quartile, is an upward pressure on compensation.
Op. No. 5, at 17 (ACrystal Is Retained to Assist Russell and Watson Evaluate the OEA 
(Ovitz Employment Agreement@))(Del. Ch., Aug. 9, 2005).
189
.   See, e.g., RAKESH KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR THE CORPORATE 
SAVIOR: THE IRRATIONAL QUEST FOR CHARISMATIC CEOs at 167 (2002).
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CEOs have also come to know how to game the system.  They tend to 
appoint to the committee the newest, and likely to be most insecure, director. 
 They then appoint a director who also is a sitting or former CEO, who has a 
vicarious interest, at least, in ever higher levels of CEO compensation.190
Nonetheless, most corporate governance schematics continue to include a 
compensation committee of outside directors as a central element.
New and Proposed.
$ The compensation committee charter should provide for semi-annual 
committee meetings with the director of human resources and the general counsel 
of the corporation to review related party transactions, human resources 
compensation levels, and complaints or disputes over benefits or other 
compensation levels.
$ The compensation committee oversees the annual review of the human 
resources director.
190
.  WARD, supra note 90, at 219.
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!Agog at the sums CEOs receive, in January, 2006, the SEC rolled out proposed 
regulations which would treble the disclosures public corporations must make 
about CEO and other senior executives= pay.  Corporations will have to narrate 
how the board of directors goes about setting pay levels, and disclose the long 
term value of stock options, the value of executive perquisites, and quantify 
severance and retirement pay to be received under existing provisions.191  The 
SEC regulations are part of the growing dissatisfaction in the U.S. about the 
inordinate growth and high levels of CEO pay.192  When adopted, the SEC will add 
a new layer of responsibilities  those compensation committees have traditionally 
had.
Risk Management Committee.
$ Risk management is one of the newer ideas prevalent in certain corporate 
191
. See Joann Lublin & Kara Scannell,  They Say Jump: SEC Plans Tougher Pay 
Rules,  Wall St. J., Jan. 11, 2006, at C1.
192
.  See LUCIEN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: 
THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004); Jesse 
Eisinger, Lavish Pay Puts a Bite on Profits, Wall St. J., Jan. 11, 2006, at C1.
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governance circles.193  The committee=s mission is to identify major risks in the 
corporation=s businesses and their operations.  The committee reviews the 
corporation=s responses to manage and minimize those risks.
$ The committee reviews risk disclosures or reports and employs experts, as 
necessary, to understand and clarify risk disclosures in documents the company 
files.
$ Modern corporate governance schematics now call for as many as six 
committees of the board of directors: audit, nominating and governance, 
compensation, legal compliance (QLLC), disclosure, and risk management.  
Individual corporations may retain one or two first generation board committees, 
such as finance or capital expenditure, as well, bringing to total to 8 or so 
committees.
The Ethics Officer and the Code of Ethics.
193
.  See, e.g., The Committee on Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO) Exposes a Draft Framework (Risk Management), 196 J. 
Accountancy 20 (2003).
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7. The Ethics Office.  The board of directors should establish a formal ethics office which 
would function under the supervision of the CEO and the CLO but with regular written reports and 
briefings for, and periodic program reviews by, the board.
8. Ethics Pledge.  In addition to overseeing signatures by employees on the code of conduct, 
the officer and officer must ensure that all new employees, as well as existing staff, swear to and 
sign an ethics pledge.
9. Annual Reviews.  The full board of directors must meet with the CLO to review (I) the 
resources and leadership of the ethics office; (ii) the adequacy of ethics and ethics compliance 
programs; and (iii) contingent legal risks the corporation may face due to ethics failures.
10. Ethics Director.  This should be a person with a substantial level of legal experience, 
ideally including direct regulatory or law enforcement experience.
11. Diversity.  Through the ethics office and human resources, the board of directors should
undertake a wide-ranging review of the corporation=s diversity practices.
Compliance Officer.
$ The suggestion has been made that corporations also recruit for upper level management 
a corporate officer whose task it to insure the corporation=s compliance with regulatory and legal 
compliance.194 In corporations in which a risk management committee exists, 
presumably such an officer would perform much of the day-to-day work of the 
committee.
194
.  SEC`Commissioner Cynthia Glassman has been a proponent.  See, e.g., 
BNA Fed. Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 34-39, at 1626 (Oct. 7, 2002)(speech by 
Commissioner Glassman to the American Society of Corporate Secretaries).
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Whistleblowers.Old and Ne .
$ SOX adds an umbrella whistle blower provision of sorts to an existing 
patchwork of other federal protection provisions.195  The provision creates a new 
cause of action for those who suffer adverse employment actions as a result of 
reporting corporate fraud.196 It is broad, covering subcontractors= and other 
employees= actions as well as those of direct employers.  The complainant must 
file with OSHA within 90 days of the occurrence.  After an investigation, written 
findings, and a hearing before an administrative law judge, OSHA may award 
damages making the employee Awhole,@ which can include litigation costs, expert 
witness fees, and reasonable attorneys= fees.197
Proposed.
195
.  These include, for example, provisions in the Toxic Substance Control Act, 
15 U.S.C. ' 2605(a) (2000); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. ' 1367 (2000); and Energy 
Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. ' 5851(a)(2000).
196
.  SOX ' 806.  See generally Steinberg & Kaufman, supra note 119, at 448.  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit gave employers some relief when it 
affirmed Department of Labor and District Court conclusions that the whistleblowing 
provisions have no extraterritorial application, rejecting the claim of am employee of an 
Argentine subsidiary.  Carnero v. Boston Scientific Corp., 433 F.3rd 1 (1st Cir 2006)
197
.  See, e.g., Welch v. Cardinal Bancshares Corp., No. 2003-SOX-15 (Dept. Of 
Labor, Jan. 28, 2004)(full award and reinstatement awarded to former corporate CFO).
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3. Private Inspector General Position.  Then SEC Enforcement Director Stephen Cutler has 
Aurged companies to appoint a permanent ombudsman or business practices officer to receive and 
investigate complaints.@198
4. Formal Intake Process.  The corporation must insure that a process exists in which the 
employee has reasonable assurance of confidentiality.  The employee should not have to notify 
anyone in a supervisory role over her199 and may, under certain schematics, blow the whistle to a 
198
.  Cutler Calls For Corporate Ombudsman to Enhance Whistleblower 
Provision, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 2156, at 4-5 (Dec. 29, 2004).
199
.  Mark R. Attwood, When the Whistle Blows: Renewed Enthusiasm Among 
Employee Watchdogs, in PLI, ADVANCED CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 2003 1157, 
1174 (PLI Handbook No. 1378);
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third party subcontractor interposed precisely for purposes of preserving anonymity.200
5. Publicized Corporate Policy.   The corporation should post notices, send letters, and 
otherwise inform employees of their whistleblowing apparatus, including the intake procedure 
and provisions for employee anonymity.201
200
.  William R. McLucas & Mark M. Oh, Whistleblowing: Protection of Corporate 
Officials and Employees Who Provide Evidence of Fraud Under the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002  in CORPORATION 2004 61, 71 (PLI Handbook No. 1411).
201
.  See, e.g., Steinberg & Kaufman, supra note 119, at 460.
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6. Educational Programs.  Corporations must assure that training exists in contractor and 
subcontractor organizations because, even through these entities may not be publicly held, the SOX 
whistle blower protections apply if the entity renders services for the publicly held corporation.202
At the end of training, the company should retain SOX policy acknowledgment certificates stating 
that employees understand the policy and agree to abide by it.203
7. Documentation.  Employees must create a document gathering and retention system so that, 
if the need arises, the company possesses evidence tending to show, or actually showing, the 
supervisors took adverse employment for reasons other than possible knowledge of whistleblowing 
activities.204
What Have We Wrought?Each corporate governance expert and each corporation can best answer the question of whether or not the corporat  governance pe ulum t day has swu g too far and wheth r the addi ion f the de ices re i wed, a d others as well, a e v luable adjuncts or jus  bells and istl s.  Only a corpo ate official, with oximity o insta lation of variou  charters, committees, co es, oftware, SOX devices and pro ss , and so n, c n e tim te the costs. Nonetheless, from n xamina i n of th events and ec mme tions f re e t years, a umber of intangibl costs hav  not been but s ould b  articulated.
202
.  Further, criminal penalties apply both to public and private companies.  See, 
e.g., id. at 448; SOX ' 1107.
203
.  Victoria Donati, Whistleblowers and Other Retaliation Claims in PLI, 
LITIGATION 2003, 987, 1021 (PLI Handbook No. 697).
204
.  Id. at 1020; Steinberg & Kaufman, supra note 119, at 462.
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$ More Is Not Necessarily Better. If four meetings a year had been adequate, and some 
corporations had six, eight meetings per year is the new standard and ten or twelve is better yet.  If 
meetings lasted an hour or an hour and a half in the Abad old days,@ meetings now should go on for 
three, four, or five hours.  More is better.
For anyone who has attended a number of meetings in her lifetime, she knows that, after a h ur and a half or two hours, meetings encounter rapidly diminishing returns.205Atte dees begin t  doo le xce sively, and toss th ir pencils i  the ir.  On  famous m n gement guru shuns meet gs as much as he i able 206Mo e - re eetings, lon r meeti gs, more committ es, a d on and on -is not better.  Someon , pr ferably som one in authority, should b ng thisdr m, a d ang i  lou ly.  I  corp rat gover ance, hing v gotten utof h .
$ The Role of Board Committees, Particularly Audit Committees.  Again, as 
originally conceived, committees were constituted by the board from among their 
own number.207  The original purpose was to aid the board in its work, and none 
other.  For example, the audit committee was an additional check, additional to 
the outside auditor and to such internal controls as existed, on the integrity of 
financial statements and similar information which would ultimately reach the full 
board and upon which it would evaluate the corporation=s senior executives.  
SOX, preceded by the NYSE and others= public statements, has changed all of 
205
.  See, e.g., SIMON RAMO, MEETINGS, MEETINGS, AND MORE 
MEETINGS; GETTING THINGS DONE WHEN PEOPLE ARE INVOLVED at 11-20 
(2005).
206
   Warren Buffett, the most celebrated investor of our times, and CEO of a 
public company, Berkshire Hathaway, Asteers clear of meetings and advisers.@  Susan 
Pulliam & Karen Richardson, Warren Buffett, Unplugged, Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 2005, at 
A1.
207
.  See footnote115 & text accompanying supra.
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this.  Audit committees now have responsibilities deemed to be directly to 
shareholders and the investing public.  Under SOX, an audit committee now has 
a stand alone existence.  The committee, and not the board, hires the outside 
auditor and receives reports.  The committee has the freedom to hire attorneys, 
accountants, and consultants on its own.  This is a sea change in the makeup 
and use of board committee but it is a sea change that has been little noticed, or 
taken for granted.
$ Change in the Role of the Board.  Along lines similar to those applicable to audit committees, with little fanfare, SOX and the g od governance movement have changed the bo d=s role, bringing it perhaps full circle back to what it onc  w s in th 1940s and 1950s.  Statut s b ckthen affirm tively pr vided that it was he b ard of ir ctors upon which the law bestowed res onsibil y for man geme t of th  corp a i n=s bu inesnd af irs.208 I any c rporations, larg  a d not s  l rge, direc ors do not ma ge.  I stea , t e overse  a d provide str t g c di ecti tment of the corp ati n by oth rs.209  Acc ding t  the r ality of this situation, i  h  la 1970s nd e rly 1980s statu began  pr vi e t at A[ ]ll rpora  po r  shall be xercised y e the uth ri y of, nd u s n aff ir f  c rp a ion m nage  by  nde thd re  f, is b ard f dir tors.@210 T r f r ad p  a less mper t veone, d by use f th  passive voice, in ntradisti ction to ld r t tu ry ommands t b a d  of di ct rs th ATh u sh l  ma g .@Th Am ric n L  I titut Corpor e Gov r a  Proj c c inu he trend.  Th  Co rat  G v r nce Proj ct p vid  that A[ ]he m nag ment of the bus e s f pu licly h ld c r ati  sh ul  co duc ed by o  u r the up r isi f su  ri cip l s ni r execu ives as ar  desi nat d 
208
.   See, e.g,, Comment to ALI CORP. GOV. PROJ. ' 3.01, at 82 (AThe 
formulation ... differs from the literal terms of the older statutory formulations (which 
commonly provided that the business of a corporation >shall be managed by [its] 
board=)@); Mo. Rev. Stat. ' 351.310 (AThe property and business shall be controlled and 
managed by a board of directors@)(1943)(2000).
209
.  For example, the ABA CORPORATE DIRECTORS GUIDEBOOK at 1603 
(rev. ed 1978), reprinted in 33 Bus. Law. 1595, states: 
It is generally recognized that the board of directors is not expected to manage the 
business.  Even under statutes ... it is recognized that actual operation is a 
function of management.  The responsibility of the board is limited to overseeing 
such operation ....
It is important to note that the role of the director is to monitor ....
210
.  RMBCA ' 8.01 (1984).
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by the board of directors.@211 In turn, the highest calling and primary mission of the board became to A[s]elect, regularly evaluate, fix the compensation f,and, where appropria e, replace the senior ex cu ives.@212 In the 1990s many c rporate boards adapted o this new, more focused r le for boards ofdirectors, monitoring the performance of, and of n replacing, chi f executive fic rs.In early 1980s, wh n th  ALI R porters intr duc d t is, it was quit  controve sial.  C porate hous  c unsel who beg n to tte d t ALI a nualeetings in droves, w r  indignant, qu stioning the stand of a law reform rganiz tion t  tell di ectors whe r y could m age or ot.213 Th  ALI s ught t a r s  thei  c cer s, affirma v ly p o iding hat a b ard hp w , ts i t  ng g  in manag m nt typ unctions.214Prio to En n and WorldCom, at l st in c rpor t  gov rn cei cl s, th  m n toring m d l had bec m  a a ce t d d s ripti n ofard=  pr pe  r e. Now, o t E ro d p st Worldcom, egul tors, i v st r , nd j urn li ts r is the h  and cry, AWh e w r  t  di ector ?  Why ere = hey naging?@  Th  answer w , nd r h  prev iling od l ey w n=t suppo d to b .B r mu t mana  ow. T  pr v iling view s ms o ha ut boards of r t r  back in the p ition t y we i  i  1955, with li tl  c g iz n  fth  wi d f c g  s in t  t r e ing c ir . It i  a separ te qu on whet r th  d vic , a b rd compr sed f p rt time v rse s, can ctua ly g , r cti ly v rse the em nt f, l rg compl x en rpris s, r wh th r the ic  r ch  or g n past i s inh rentlimit i s.215 R flecti g d ubt  ut bo d = ability t a e, SOX nd
211
.  ALI CORP. GOV. PROJ. ' 3.01.
212
.  Id. ' 3.02(a)(1).
213
.  The author is an elected member of the American Law Institute and attended 
every one of its annual meetings from 1981 to 1994, save the San Francisco meeting in 
1991.
214
.  ALI CORP. GOV. PROJ. ' 3.02 (b).
215
.  AIt is plainly impossible for a board composed partly of >outsiders,= that is partly 
of persons who are not full time employees, to conduct ... day-to-day [corporate] affairs.@
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other modern reforms place much of their emphasis on strengthening gat keepers other than ind pendent directors.  The point here, however, is that anoth  sea change has taken plac , with little seeming aware ess of w re we hav  been, or of wher  we might be going.  
Business Roundtable, Statement of Position Concerning the Role of Corporate Directors, 
33 Bus. Law. 2083, 2094 (1978).  
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$ Monitors and Inspectors.  Under English Company law, regulators may 
appoint an inspector, who delves deeply into the affairs of public companies that 
have gone awry.216  She then publishes a book length work that divines what may 
have gone wrong.  In commonwealth countries, company law may provide for a 
Royal Commission, a distinguished body, headed up by a judge on leave from the 
bench.217  After its investigation, the Royal Commission reports its findings, often in 
a multi-volume work.  In Australia, for example, a Royal Commission has reported 
back on what went wrong at HIH Insurance, Australia=s largest corporate 
collapse.218
In the United States, and unlike the U.K. and elsewhere, short of bankruptcy, no statutory authority exists for such a thing.  In bankruptcy, courts of en appoint examiners, who hire fancy law firms (often t ei  wn), and who t  ren er not o  but two o  three expensiv  and le gthyreports.219La k of statu ory autho ity has not stopped U.S. courts.  Federal dist ict judges h ve appoint d Acorp rat  monitors,@ who go insid  of tr bled ompanies f th at  tim . They th  render l ngthy, nd ex en iv  r or s. Judges ave a po n d monitors to review an  report on rporate ve c  Hollinger Inte nati nal, and W rldCom (later k ow  s MCI), among othe s.220
216
.   See Companies Act of 1985 ' 432.
217
.   See, e.g., Royal Commissions Act of 1902 ' 1A (Australia).
218
.  See MARK WESTFIELD, HIH: THE INSIDE STORY OF AUSTRALIA=S 
BIGGEST CORPORATE COLLAPSE (2003); Michael Adams, Australian Corporate 
Governance: Lessons from HIH Insurance, Austalasian Law Teachers Assoc. 
Conference, Wiakato University, Hamilton, New Zealand, July 8, 2005.
219
.  See notes 85-87 & accompanying text supra.
220
.  See Joann Lublin & Shawn Young, Even as MCI Makes Strides, Monitor 
Stays, Wall St. J., April 20, 2004, at B1 (former SEC Chair Richard Breeden, alone and 
via his Greenwich, CT, consulting firm billed $2.3 billion at $800 per hour, over 21 
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Perhaps the next bell (or whistle) may be a proposal statutorily to authoriz  this new breed of outside corpor te cop.  Certainly, many corp ate monitors and legal aca mics do not sc ibe to the proposi ion that Amore isn=t n cessarily be ter.@  They te d not only t  hold the pp site view bu  would be willing to wri  the law review rticl s, give the Congressi nal stimo y, and do whatever els it tak to advocate a sche e in which th  presumption i  that mor is bett r.cl ion.The ti   come for  retrenchm n  fr m Sarbanes-Oxle .  T is ar cle attempts o d m trat ot onl  one f t e osts OX p s but m r over the welter of rop al , rvices, and s f ar , ing fr m l  directions, at publicly h ld corpo ati s, i  t i  w $35 illi  p r yea i us y.  Th t lon i  one reason f r retr chme . l gisl ti =s mos utsp ken s onso , R p e ntative Mic l Oxley, as taken th  p s tio  hat Ait is li ly that C ngr ss will r vi i i .@221   Bycontr t, th  SEC= Advi ory Committ e on S ll Compa i  has t k  a freshing and pr activ  stanc , recom ding limi ti of SOX se ti n 404sta i  pr c d re for m ll c rporati n , m ng other t gs.222  P rhapsth  Commi t e, r t e Am r c  Bar Ass i ti , or b th, ould ake t  l ad,s di g t e m s g  that m r  is  ec s arily bett r.Ot r c untr es v  c m  to he co clu i tha , v n m ng public mp ni s, ti r  f i closure and th r qu re nt  y be mor  a pr ri tn A e siz fit  ll.@223  Th U it d St t s hould v lve, n u horit tive b di s uld advo ate, a t
months, and showed no sign of leaving).
221
.  Congress Unlikely to Revisit Sarbanes-Oxley to Help Small Companies, BNA 
Fed. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 37-42, at 1781 (Oct. 17, 2005)(Oct. 24, 2005)(speech at Atlanta, 
GA, law firm of McKenna, Long & Aldridge).
222
.  Panel Seeks To End Auditor Attestation Under SOX ' 404 for Micros, Small 
Caps, BNA Fed Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 37-43, at 1825 (Oct. 31, 2005).
223
.  See, e.g., Karen Howlett, Regulators Propose Two-Tiered Disclosure, The 
Globe and Mail (Toronto, Canada), Oct. 30, 2004, at B7.
or ven r  tie ed syst ot only of disclo re ut of SOX as well.  Such  y t m w l  nstitu  th  r otst l f   ge ratio  f r new d tre eneur hip n  c p al for i n in th Unit Stat s.
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